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Resumo Dada a importaˆncia que as redes assumem nos dias de hoje, e´ fundamental
garantir comunicac¸o˜es sem falhas e, nesta a´rea, a gesta˜o de redes tem tido
um papel crucial atrave´s da utilizac¸a˜o de diversas ferramentas de monitor-
izac¸a˜o. A camada de Dados e a camada de Rede do modelo OSI usam,
respectivamente, enderec¸os MAC e enderec¸os IP para proporcionar a co-
municac¸a˜o entre os diferentes dispositivos de rede. Uma vez que este e´
um modelo bastante usado, e´ frequentemente explorado para actividades
maliciosas. Ataques de IP spoofing e MAC spoofing sa˜o fonte de va´rias
ameac¸as a` seguranc¸a das redes, pelo que prevenir estes ataques e´ essencial
para se obter uma rede protegida e de confianc¸a.
Esta dissertac¸a˜o apresenta alguns mecanismos eficientes de apoio a` adminis-
trac¸a˜o de rede atrave´s da realizac¸a˜o de tarefas de monitorizac¸a˜o espec´ıficas
baseadas no uso do protocolo SNMP, que e´ suportado por grande parte
do equipamento de rede existente no mercado. O SNMP permite aceder
remotamente aos dispositivos de rede e obter informac¸a˜o contida nas suas
MIBs. Numa primeira etapa, foi proposto um algoritmo de descoberta da
topologia da rede que permite identificar os dispositivos presentes nesta, tal
como obter informac¸a˜o u´til da rede atrave´s da selec¸a˜o e manipulac¸a˜o da in-
formac¸a˜o da MIB; de seguida, e seguindo o mesmo princ´ıpio, foi apresentado
um algoritmo para detetar ataques de MAC spoofing e IP spoofing. Foram
realizados va´rios testes de avaliac¸a˜o de desempenho e os resultados obtidos
provaram que as metodologias desenvolvidas fornecem um conjunto com-
pleto de ferramentas de monitorizac¸a˜o de redes capaz de encontrar qualquer
dispositivo que suporte SNMP e de rapidamente e eficientemente detetar e
bloquear ataques de MAC spoofing e IP spoofing.

Keywords SNMP, MAC Spoofing, IP Spoofing, Network Discovery.
Abstract Due to the importance of communication networks on current days, it is
essential to ensure seamless communications. Network management has a
crucial role in this area, through the use of many monitoring tools. The
Data Link and Network layers of the OSI model use, respectively, MAC
addresses and IP addresses to provide communication between the different
network devices. Since this is a widely used model, it is frequently explored
for various malicious activities. IP spoofing and MAC spoofing attacks are
the origin of many security threats, so preventing them is essential to obtain
a protected and trustful network.
This dissertation presents some efficient mechanisms to support network
administration by performing specific monitoring tasks, based on the use
of SNMP protocol, which is supported by most of the existing network
equipment. SNMP allows to remotely access network devices and retrieve
information contained in their MIBs. On a first stage, this Thesis proposes
a network discovery algorithm that allows identifying the devices present on
the network as well as obtaining useful network information by selecting and
manipulating the MIB information; then, following the same principle, the
Thesis presentes an algorithm to detect both IP and MAC spoofing attacks.
Many performance evaluation tests were conducted and the obtained results
proved that the developed methodologies provide a complete set of network
monitoring tools that are able to find any network device that supports
SNMP and quickly and efficiently detect and block MAC and IP spoofing
attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Today, networks have a fundamental role in our lives, being used for business, communi-
cation, data exchange, entertainment, and so on. Due to this increasing importance, networks
have been improved in order to become more resilient, secure and able to cope with the ap-
pearance of new technologies and applications. The seven layer OSI model was adopted by
most of the systems to provide communication between devices. Layer 2, called Data Link
layer, uses a physical MAC address to provide communication between the different devices
in a local network. This address is a serial number that uniquely identifies the device. Layer
3, called Network Layer, is responsible for packet routing functions, using the IP protocol to
deliver packets from source to destination based on their IP addresses.
Due to the importance that networks acquired, it is essential to properly manage all its
constituent devices and connections. The network administrator must be able to monitor
the entire network and its complete activity. Network monitoring can be described as a set
of tasks that constantly monitors the performance and usage of a network and notifies the
network administrator whenever a certain relevant event happens. It became an important
part of of the network running process, by providing the necessary information to keep all
operations under control. Thus, many network monitoring tools have been developed in
order to perform different monitoring tasks. These tasks go from simple information about
the network topology and devices, detection of network failures, control over the exchanged
data or detection of malicious intruders.
Monitoring a network is especially important in those cases where communication net-
works are fundamental to run a business. In these situations, a network failure could be
equivalent to lost of revenues, so it needs to be fixed as soon as possible. Knowing each
device present in the network, knowing how they are connected and their performance are
just some examples of monitoring tasks that could save a lot of time on the detection of net-
work failures and, therefore, reduce the losts that are caused by these outages. Despite this
situation, network monitoring tools are always useful to support networks administration, so
it is not surprising that the network management area has been increasingly explored and
developed.
To have a trustful network, it is also necessary to take security issues into consideration.
A lot of techniques using different approaches have been created to get unauthorized access
to networks and perform different malicious activities. These network attacks take advantage
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of network failures to affect their targets on many ways. The objective could be intercept
secret information that only legitimate users can have access, overload a server or a network
connection, among many others. However, having in consideration the method used by the
intruder to perform the attack, it is possible to develop techniques that are able to detect and
block them. For this reason, the creation of monitoring tools directed to network security has
been intensively explored.
1.2 Objectives
As previously said, regardless of the objectives for which a network is deployed, moni-
toring tools have become fundamental. This work is focused on the development of a set of
methodologies for network monitoring: it will be proposed a method for network discovery
and two different methodologies for the detection of network attacks. In the first case, the de-
veloped methodology will find and distinguish all devices present on the network and retrieve
information from them. The retrieved information is related not only to the device but also
to the network itself, by consulting routing tables and ARP tables in case of Layer 3 devices
and forwarding tables from Layer 2 devices. In terms of the detection of network attacks,
the developed methodologies are specifically focused on spoofing attacks. In this type of at-
tacks, the intruder tries to get access to a network for which he doesn’t have authorization
by impersonating a legitimate user. So, basically the attacker fakes his own access data in
order to be able to perform malicious activities over the network. Depending on the faked
information, a particular case of spoofing attack will be triggered. If the intruder changes
the MAC address of the host he is using to access the network in order to match the one
of an authenticated client, we are facing a MAC spoofing attack. Another particular case is
the IP spoofing attack which, following the same idea, consists of the configuration of the
IP address of the attacker’s host in order to be the same as the client IP address. Thus,
both methodologies developed for the detection of network attacks will treat the problem of
spoofing attacks, focusing particularly on MAC spoofing and IP spoofing attacks.
The proposed approaches to perform network discovery and detect the previously men-
tioned network attacks will be based on the SNMP protocol. SNMP is used to remotely
manage network devices by using data stored on their MIB and is currently supported by
most of the network devices. A MIB is a virtual database with information about the net-
work and the device itself. This information is hierarchically organized and each object is
identified by the OID. It is possible to detect and block MAC and IP spoofing attacks, as well
as perform network discovery, simply by retrieving and managing the information contained
on the MIB of each network device.
In summary, the main objective of this project is the development of open-source method-
ologies that can be integrated on operating networks in order to support network adminis-
tration. In particular, the work is focused on the development of three different monitoring
tools dedicated to specific tasks. For each one, an algorithm exclusively based on SNMP will
be presented, together with a possible implementation.
1.3 Contributions
SNMP is becoming globally accepted by all network equipment manufacturers, while the
functionalities that this protocol can provide in terms of network management and moni-
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toring are still being proposed and developed. In this context, the methodologies that were
developed in this dissertation, and were described in the previous section, can be considered
somehow innovative. After an intensive research, it was observed that there are already some
proposed solutions for network discovery using SNMP, but there isn’t any solution that uses
this protocol to detect spoofing attacks or any other type of network attack. Thus, given
the inovative characteristic of the developed work, a paper titled ”Algorithms for Network
Discovery and Detection of MAC and IP Spoofing Security Attacks” was written, propos-
ing methodologies and solutions for network discovery and detection of MAC spoofing and
IP spoofing attacks based on the SNMP protocol. This paper was accepted for publication
at the 5th International Conference on Emerging Network Intelligence (EMERGING 2013),
which will take place from September 29th to October 3rd 2013 at OPorto, Portugal.
1.4 Dissertation Structure
This dissertation is structured as follows:
• Chapter two introduces the network monitoring thematic. It will describe some of the
protocols that are used for network monitoring and to remotely access network devices;
then, some of the most used Network Monitoring Systems (NMS) will also be presented
and, at last, it will define and describe the MIB of a network device, whether it was
developed by Cisco Systems or any other manufacturer;
• Chapter three is focused on spoofing attacks. It will make a description of this type
of attacks, in particular, MAC spoofing and IP spoofing attacks; it will discuss some
detection approaches and methodologies and present some of the available Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS);
• In chapter four the developed network discovery methodology will be presented. First,
the algorithm will be described and, then some considerations will be made about;
finally, a possible implementation for the algorithm will be proposed;
• Chapter five is focused on the two developed methodologies for the detection of spoofing
attacks. This chapter is divided into two main sections: the first section will present
the algorithm for MAC spoofing detection and the second will present the IP spoofing
detection algorithm. Each section will start by describing the algorithm that was pro-
posed for the attack detection and, then, the algorithm for attack blocking. At last,
practical implementations for both algorithms will be suggested;
• Chapter six will describe all equipment, virtual and real, used for the creation of the
testing scenarios, as well as the software that was used on the simulations conducted to
validate the developed algorithms;
• In chapter seven, the network scenario created to test the developed methodologies will
be explained; then, all test results obtained from the network simulations and from the
execution of the implemented algorithms will be presented. An analysis of these results
will also be made;
• Finally, chapter eight will present some possible future enhancements to the developed
algorithms, as well as other monitoring methodologies that could be created using SNMP
the protocol; finally, the global conclusions about the developed work will be presented.
3
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Chapter 2
Network Monitoring
2.1 Introduction
The current growth on networks complexity demands efficient and secure methods to
monitor and manage communication networks. Those methods will allow an easy monitoring
of the network performance and the detection of any failures that could arise, keeping basically
the network under control. Nowadays, it is essential that any network administrator uses some
software or tool that automatically performs these monitoring tasks in order to facilitate his
work and, essentially, to turn it more efficient. Depending on the context where the network is
deployed, different network characteristics need to be analyzed. For this reason, many network
monitoring systems have been created to perform specific monitoring tasks. A huge variety
of these systems is currently available, each one using different approaches and techniques.
The first section of this chapter intends to discuss some of the protocols used to support
remote monitoring applications and provide access to the information contained in network
devices. Then, some of the most used and popular NMS for network administration will be
presented. This will allow to create a general idea of the monitoring tools provided by these
systems, as well as the methods that were adopted to develop them. Finally, the concept of
MIB will be explained and some examples of its contents will be presented. MIBs are used
together with the SNMP protocol to manage network devices. As it will be seen in the next
section, SNMP will be the protocol used to support the network monitoring methodologies
developed on this dissertation and, for this reason, it is essential to understand it, as well as
its relation with the MIB of the devices.
2.2 Network Monitoring Protocols
Many network protocols have been created in order to provide access to remote hosts from
a local computer, inside a LAN or over the Internet. These hosts can either be simple end
hosts or network devices and these protocols work, normally, on a client/server principle. By
getting access to these remote devices, it is possible to manage them and perform a set of
operations by executing specific commands. Some of the operations available allow consulting
and obtaining useful information that can be used to develop network monitoring tools. So,
the choice of the protocol that is used to remotely access the network devices is fundamental
because all the developed work throughout the dissertation will be based on this protocol.
The most popular and more commonly used remote access protocols are Telnet, SSH and
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SNMP. The next paragraphs will make a description of each of these protocols, as well as
an analysis in order to evaluate which protocol would better fit the dissertation’s context.
Another commonly used network protocol is CDP, which is a protocol developed by Cisco to
perform monitoring tasks over Cisco devices. So, this protocol will also be described later in
this section.
2.2.1 Telnet
Telnet is a network protocol used to connect remote machines in the same LAN or over
the Internet. It was launched in 1969 and it is known as one of the earliest network protocols
[2]. Back on time, computers were synonymous of large mainframes developed to perform
different tasks, if a user needed to use different machines, that would lead to many wasted
hours of walking to access to the terminal of each machine located in different places and
Telnet was initially developed to overcome this problem. It is based on the concept of a
connection-oriented session between a client and a server during a relatively large period of
time, running over TCP. TCP connection is done to log into a remote machine and the local
machine connects to an open port using the IP address or domain name of the server [3, 4].
This allows a machine to have multiple simultaneous sessions by identifying it with the IP
address and port number of the client. Once connected, a CLI appears and UNIX based
commands must be executed to interact and manage the remote machine. Telnet is mostly
used to perform remote management and also to setup and configure network devices like
switches, routers or access points. The great advantages of the Telnet functionality is that
most operating systems support this tool, besides the fact that most services are accessible via
a Telnet connection. The main problems are related to security issues. By default, it doesn’t
support encryption and most of implementations don’t even have authentication, which is a
great problem since passwords and other secret information is exchanged between devices and
anybody who intercepts these packets can have access to important data. Due to this lack of
security, Telnet has been discontinued and replaced by more secure tools.
2.2.2 SSH
One of these tools is SSH. SSH was first published in July 1995 and it is another network
management protocol developed to provide remote access primarily on UNIX and Linux envi-
ronments [5]. Like Telnet, it intends to log into a remote machine over any network to execute
commands and transfer files from one device to another. However, SSH uses cryptographic
algorithms to authenticate both client and server and provides encryption to all transferred
data. In this way, it prevents attackers from accessing any secret information contained in
data packets by protecting its integrity, being the most secure tool to access servers over
insecure channels. There are several other features provided by SSH, like TCP/IP ports ar-
bitrarily defined, encryption used to protect against spoofed packets and RSA authentication
on client and server to prevent network attacks [6]. Regarding the performance of the SSH
protocol, we can say that it has a startup time on the order of a second and a transfer rate
dependent on the encryption algorithm but directly proportional to the speed of the device.
Compared with Telnet, SSH can achieve substantially faster transfer rates on long-distance
connections due to compression of transmitted data. For this reason, but mainly for the
strong authentication and secure communications of SSH, this protocol is nowadays the most
used to access remote devices.
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In the context of this dissertation, SSH also allows the execution of commands directly
from the local machine without having to actually logging into the remote device. So, it
would be possible to use SSH for the creation of the monitoring tools. However, it has the
disadvantage that the necessary information for the development of these methodologies is not
easily accessible as it is, for example, using SNMP. So, the creation of algorithms is difficult
using this protocol. For this reason, SSH was not the chosen tool to support this project.
2.2.3 SNMP
Other used network management tool is SNMP. The first version of SNMP was launched
in late 1980s and it covers not only the protocol itself but also the MIB objects. This
protocol allows a client or manager to poll network devices (agents) running on a network for
specific information [7]. This information is contained in the MIB, a text file hierarchically
organized with information about the device and the network. SNMP uses specific commands
to access and manage this information and the separation between protocol and management
information reduces significantly its complexity [8]. Table 2.1 presents some of the most used
SNMP commands that are used to remotely manage the information contained on the device
MIB.
Table 2.1: SNMP commands
SNMP Command Description
snmpget It uses the SNMP GET request to query for information
on a network entity.
snmpgetnext It uses the SNMP GETNEXT request to query for informa-
tion on a network entity. For each OID argument, the vari-
able that is lexicographically ”next” in the remote entity’s
MIB is returned.
snmpwalk It uses the SNMP GETNEXT requests to query a network
entity for a tree of information.
snmpbulkwalk It uses the SNMP GETBULK requests to query a network
entity efficiently for a tree of information.
snmptable It retrieves an SNMP table and display it in tabular form
using repeatedly SNMP GETNEXT and GETBULK requests
to query for information on a network entity.
snmpset It uses the SNMP SET request to set information on a net-
work entity.
snmptrapd It receives and logs SNMP TRAP and INFORM messages.
Usually a device MIB contains a great variety of information. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show
two examples of the returned information after an snmpwalk command is executed and how
this information is organized. Fig. 2.1 represents the information related with the system
that the device is using and 2.2 corresponds to the information returned from the device MIB
that contains its ARP table data. As can be seen, only part of the returned information is
useful and, therefore, it is necessary a certain knowledge about the protocol itself and the
device MIB in order to be able to exclusively select important data.
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Figure 2.1: SNMP command example - System information
Figure 2.2: SNMP command example - ARP Table information
SNMP is an application protocol encapsulated in UDP and currently it has three versions.
The main differences from the first to the second version are mainly the addiction of new
protocol operations. On other hand, from versions 2 to 3 the differences are more related with
security improvements and remote configuration capabilities [9]. Compared to the previous
remote access tools, instead of getting access into a remote machine as it is done in Telnet and
SSH and then executing commands to consult information as we were working directly on the
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device, SNMP simply sends commands from the local machine to obtain information from
the server, without having to log into it. This has the advantage that it is only necessary to
execute commands in order to get information from any network device that supports SNMP
(nowadays most of the devices actually do).
This last point was actually the main reason for the choice of SNMP as the protocol used
on this project to remotely access the different devices present in the network and to support
the creation of network monitoring methodologies. The ease of use and the simplicity of this
protocol allows an efficient development of algorithms that will automatically send SNMP
commands to retrieve information contained on each device MIB and manage this data in
order to perform network discovery and to detect IP spoofing and MAC spoofing attacks.
2.2.4 CDP
Unlike previous network protocols, which are focused on the remote access and manage-
ment of hosts, CDP was developed by Cisco to discover Cisco devices on the network. It is
a Data Link Layer protocol and must be enabled on each device to become visible to others.
Once enabled, the Cisco device sends periodic information from each connected interface to
a multicast destination address. In this way, packets are received by all Cisco devices that
have CDP enabled and are directly connected to the device. Thus, each device that supports
CDP stores the information received from other devices in a table that is updated each time
an announcement is received. The table contains different information about all neighbors,
like the operating system version, IP addresses or the device host name. After a defined time
without receiving information about a certain device, its information is discarded [10].
This protocol could also be a possibility for the development of network monitoring
methodologies by using information contained in the table of each device. However, this
protocol can only be applied to Cisco equipment, which is a disadvantage since one of the
objectives of this dissertation is to develop general methodologies for network monitoring.
Furthermore, SNMP is still simpler to use for the development of these methodologies and,
for that reason, it is the chosen protocol.
2.3 Network Monitoring Systems (NMS)
A network monitoring system consists of an application that is deployed over a network to
constantly perform monitoring tasks such as performance evaluation, network equipment dis-
covery, monitoring the health and status of the devices and notify the network administrator
whenever any anomaly is detected [11]. Network monitoring can be considered as a subset
of functions associated to network management, which is a concept based on the FCAPS
model [12]. FCAPS stands for Fault, Configuration, Accounting, Performance and Security
and describes the management categories that define the whole set of network management
tasks.
The previous network protocols are employed by network monitoring systems on the
development of various monitoring applications. For example, SNMP can be used to gather
information from network devices and use this information for the development of monitoring
tools. So, this section will present some of these network monitoring systems.
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2.3.1 CiscoWorks LMS
CiscoWorks is a management tool developed by Cisco Systems to facilitate the tasks of
configuration, administration, monitoring and troubleshooting Cisco networks. The two main
packages provided by CiscoWorks are the LAN Management Solution (LMS) and the Router
WAN (RWAN) application. Although the packages’ names could induce that LMS is directed
to switches and RWAN for routers, this is not true. Actually, CiscoWorks LMS is able to look
after both switches and routers and the difference to RWAN is mostly related to additional
features such as the ACL Manager and IPM [13]. Thus, if the user does’t need these two
additional applications, CiscoWorks LMS should be enough. There are some other packages
associated to CiscoWorks, such as QoS Policy Manager, VPN/Security Management Solu-
tion and IP Telephony Environment Monitor, that provide additional network management
solutions, but with functionalities that are out of the scope of this dissertation.
So, referring to CiscoWorks LMS, the integration of this software over networks is a
solution for the improvement of the accuracy and efficiency of network operations, for a
better control over the network with simplified device configurations, faster identification
and fixing of network problems and also for more secure networks through the use of access
control services and audit of network changes [14]. In terms of features, CiscoWorks LMS
has many components, which are associated to the software in order to perform specific
management tasks. For example, Campus Manager is an application that draws topology
maps and allows to graphically visualize how the network is connected; CiscoView provides a
graphical front-panel that displays Cisco devices to simplify the interaction between user and
network equipment, while Device Fault Manager provides real-time and detailed detection,
analysis and reporting of device faults [15].
An important component associated to CiscoWorks LMS is CiscoWorks RME. This appli-
cation is responsible for the lifecycle management of Cisco equipment, reducing manual tasks
associated to network maintenance. CiscoWorks RME has the following features [16]:
• Inventory management;
• Device configuration management;
• Software image management;
• Change audit services;
• Syslog analysis.
It uses a mix of the CDP and SNMP protocols to request information from the network
and it is really useful for large networks with a lot of network equipment. In the context of
this dissertation, we will perform the specific task of network discovery, which is related to
the inventory management feature provided by CiscoWorks RME. So, the network discovery
application that will be presented in a later chapter should be a reliable alternative to the
one provided by this software.
2.3.2 SolarWinds
SolarWinds is a company specialized in network management software. Unlike Cisco
Systems, which produces network devices and then develop management tools to support
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its equipment, SolarWinds only sells applications for network maintenance, monitoring and
troubleshooting. This company was founded in 1999 with the goal of creating efficient man-
agement tools, but only since 2005 SolarWinds registered a greater growth, being now one of
the best producers of network monitoring systems [17].
In terms of products and services, SolarWinds has a wide range of applications, all of
them downloadable. For network faults and performance monitoring, a platform called NPM
is available. This software intends to be an easy-to-use tool to quickly detect, diagnose
and solve performance issues before outages occur. It shows performance statistics in real-
time using dynamic network topology maps and it includes dashboards, alerts and reports
related to the monitoring tasks. Another feature of NPM is the ability to perform automated
network device discovery and to monitor response time, availability and uptime of routers,
switches and all SNMP-enabled devices [18]. This functionality is really close to the network
discovery application developed under this dissertation because it also uses SNMP to discover
network devices. Other features provided by NPM are the hardware health monitoring,
network availability and monitoring (also based on the SNMP protocol), which includes switch
port mapper, advanced subnet calculator, bandwidth utilization, packet loss, multi-vendor
device support or intelligent network alerting. In terms of other applications provided by this
software that are based on the SNMP protocol, a custom MIB poller functionality is also
available to collect detailed data from the devices MIB and monitor their performance and
statistics.
Another important application developed by SolarWinds is Orion NCM, which is a soft-
ware directed to network configuration and management and can be used individually or
integrated with NPM software to display health configuration indicators alongside with per-
formance statistics. Orion NCM itself simplifies the task of managing network configuration
files using a web interface, allowing to quickly fix and change any configuration parameters
from network devices without having to manually access them through Telnet or SSH [19].
Thus, the most relevant features of this software are its ability to efficiently troubleshoot
network issues, manage and remotely control network configurations, schedule automated
backups from devices configurations, make the inventory of all network devices present in
the network or identify the connection type from the network equipment to each end host
(wired or wireless). Orion NCM includes a network discovery funcionality similar to the NPM
application, which records the devices information into a database.
SolarWinds also has many other applications available, some of them free, designed to
perform more specific monitoring tasks, including a Cisco NetFlow tool that allows configuring
Cisco devices via SNMP. So, SolarWinds is a large company that developed a great variety
of applications to support network administration, while the methodologies developed in this
project will only perform some specific monitoring tasks, constituting a small part of the tools
offered by these applications.
2.3.3 Nagios
The last software that will be presented is Nagios. This application was launched in 1999
and works as a network monitoring system destined to organizations that want to identify
and solve IT problems before they affect the business process [20]. Unlike CiscoWorks and
SolarWinds, Nagios is a free and open-source software written and maintained by a group of
developers that constantly creates new plugins to provide new monitoring functionalities and
designed to run on Unix operating systems.
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Nagios has many projects focused on different tasks. Nagios Core is the monitoring and
alerting engine that works as the nuclear application around which many other Nagios projects
are developed [21]. So, Nagios Core was designed with an extensible architecture to provide
more flexibility and scalability and to allow the addition of different plugins. This application
is focused on checking scheduling, execution and processing tasks, as well as event handling
and alerting [22]. This means that Nagios Core doesn’t perform any specific monitoring task
over networks, being the base application that supports other addon projects.
Nagios Plugins are software applications that work as extensions for Nagios Core and are
executed by this main program. These plugins are mostly developed by Nagios community
members (nearly 2,000 plugins available), even though there are also official plugins developed
by the Nagios Plugin team [23]. So, these developed plugins are responsible for the monitoring
tools that Nagios offers. Having in account the number of existent plugins, it is normal that
there are already several applications to perform a great variety of monitoring tasks in any
type of hardware or service.
In general, some of the main features provided by Nagios are its capability to monitor
applications, services, operating systems, network protocols, system metrics or infrastructure
components, the ability to provide detailed network performance statistics through a web
interface, a centralized view of the monitored network, fast detection of infrastructure out-
ages and the ability to provide the correspondent alerts and complete reports with network
performance information [24]. Other important advantages of this software are the fact that
it is free and open-source, providing full access to the source code, and it has a complete API
that allows any user to easily create custom monitoring applications in many programming
languages (C, C++, Bash, PHP, Perl, etc.).
In this chapter we described three different network monitoring systems with different
characteristics. The previous section explained the reason for the choice of SNMP as the
protocol used to perform the network monitoring methodologies developed in this project. All
mentioned monitoring systems support this protocol: CiscoWorks and SolarWinds integrated
SNMP from the origin, while Nagios as a pluggin that can be added to the core application.
The next section will define the concept of MIB, which is closely related to SNMP.
2.4 Management Information Base (MIB)
As was previously said, MIB is a virtual database present in most of network devices.
Its content is composed by a great diversity of information related to the device itself and
to the network where it is deployed. To turn this information available and accessible for
management purposes, the MIB is associated to the SNMP protocol. In this way, when an
SNMP command is sent from a local host, it is possible to manipulate the MIB data. This
information is organized hierarchically in a tree format, as shown on Figure 2.3, being defined
by a unique OID that specifies the object.
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Figure 2.3: MIB tree example. Source: [1]
The OID consists of a sequence of numbers separated by dots. Starting from the top
of the tree, each number corresponds to the number of each branch that has to be followed
until the desired MIB object is reached. It is also possible to identify the MIB object by
the correspondent object name. By executing SNMP commands from a local machine, it is
possible to manipulate these MIB objects and, therefore, the information contained in each
network device that supports this protocol. Depending on the equipment manufacturer, a
device may contain different MIBs with specific objects. So, when using SNMP to perform
monitoring tasks, it is essential to know in first place the device manufacturer as well as the
specific MIBs that each device contains.
2.4.1 Cisco Equipment
Cisco Systems is the biggest producer of network equipment, providing a great variety of
products and services for different market segments. To support all this equipment, Cisco has
been developing MIBs, with all necessary information about the devices, that can be used
by network management stations. As previously said, SNMP is the protocol that manages
the MIB information. Even though each MIB has a great quantity of information, normally
only part of it is useful. Table 2.2 presents some of the MIB objects contained in the Cisco
IP-FORWARD-MIB. These objects have information about the routing table of Cisco routers,
such as destination networks and corresponding network masks, next-hop IP addresses, used
interfaces, route types and route metrics.
Table 2.3 presents other MIB objects usually used to perform monitoring tasks. These
objects allow retrieve information about IP addresses corresponding to the media-dependent
physical addresses and corresponding address types (static or dynamic), MAC addresses and
interfaces. The two first objects are contained in the IP-MIB, while the other two are in the
RFC1213-MIB from Cisco.
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Table 2.2: Some MIB objects from Cisco IP-FOWARD-MIB
MIB Object OID
ipCidrRouteDest .1.3.6.1.2.1.4.24.4.1.1
ipCidrRouteMask .1.3.6.1.2.1.4.24.4.1.2
ipCidrRouteNextHop .1.3.6.1.2.1.4.24.4.1.4
ipCidrRouteIfIndex .1.3.6.1.2.1.4.24.4.5
ipCidrRouteType .1.3.6.1.2.1.4.24.4.1.6
ipCidrRouteMetric1 .1.3.6.1.2.1.4.24.4.1.11
Table 2.3: Some MIB objects from Cisco IP-MIB and RFC1213-MIB
MIB Object OID
ipNetToMediaNetAddress .1.3.6.1.2.1.4.22.1.3
ipNetToMediaType .1.3.6.1.2.1.4.22.1.4
atPhysAddress .1.3.6.1.2.1.3.1.1.2
atIfIndex .1.3.6.1.2.1.3.1.1.1
The previously mentioned MIBs are just some of the most commonly objects used on
network monitoring. But there is a lot of other MIBs that can contain useful information.
For example, the Cisco IF-MIB has information about the interfaces of the device and the
BRIDGE-MIB is related to Layer 2 network devices. Cisco has developed MIBs that allow
any monitoring task using the SNMP protocol, so we only have to search for the right MIB
object of each network device.
2.4.2 Other Equipment
Obviously, Cisco is not the only company that has been developing MIBs to support their
network equipment. SNMP became globally accepted and, nowadays, most of network devices
support this protocol. Thus, the creation of MIBs was mandatory to manufacturers in order
to allow using SNMP for the remote management of their devices. Besides Cisco Systems,
some of the major networking equipment companies are [25]:
• Juniper Networks;
• Alcatel-Lucent;
• Huawei Technologies;
These companies are just some examples of network equipment manufacturers that have
developed their own MIBs supporting SNMP. Let us start by Juniper Networks, an American
company founded in 1996, whose main products are routers, Ethernet switches and security
devices. Routers were the first product to be commercialized in 1998 and Juniper’s switches
were only introduced ten years later, in 2008. Juniper Networks owns also an operating system
called Junos, which is run in most of their products. In terms of security equipment, they
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produce a line of firewall equipment, security services devices and SSL-based VPN services
to provide remote access through regular web browsers on many platforms [26]. To support
SNMP, Juniper Networks has created a total of 412 MIBs to cover all their network equipment,
making a total of 19,683 MIB objects [27]. One of the main MIBs developed by Juniper, and
the one that contains more information, is the JUNIPER-MIB.
Alcatel-Lucent is a French company that provides telecommunications solutions to service
providers, enterprises and governments. This company owns Bell Labs, which is one of the
largest research and development centres in the communications industry [28]. Alcatel-Lucent
is mainly focused on the creation of fixed, mobile and converged networking hardware, Layer
3 technologies working over IP, software and services. Thus, this company is more general
than Juniper Networks in terms of produced equipment due to the research lab they hold. In
terms of created MIBs that support remote access to the network equipment through SNMP,
Alcatel-Lucent developed 215 MIBs with a total of 21,008 MIB objects [29]. The MIB that
contains more objects and, consequently, more information is the ADN-MIB.
Huawei Technologies is a Chinese company founded in 1988 that produces networking
and telecommunications equipment. In general, Huawei provides operational and consulting
services to enterprises in any part of the world and also develops and produces networking
equipment for the consumer market. This company have three core business segments: tele-
com carrier networks, enterprise business and devices manufacturing [30]. The first business
segment is centred on the development of network technologies and services, offering mobile
infrastructures, broadband access and service provider routers and switches. The second seg-
ment consists of services and solutions to support other telecommunication companies and
operators and the last one is focused on the production of electronic communication devices
like smartphones, modems or wireless terminals, either under its own name or under white-
label products that are sold to other companies. To support the SNMP protocol, Huawei
Technologies developed 190 MIBs, with a total of 10,781 MIB objects [31]. In this case,
HUAWEI-MIB is the one that contains the most important device information.
These three companies represent alternatives to Cisco Systems, even though each one is
more targeted to specific business segments. Other companies like D-Link, Netgear or Nokia
Siemens Networks are also network equipment manufacturers that could be actual alternatives
as well. What all these companies have in common, in the context of this dissertation, is the
fact that they have developed their own MIBs to support the remote management of the
equipment they produce using the SNMP protocol.
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Chapter 3
Spoofing Attacks
3.1 Definition
Dishonest people have always existed, people that try to take advantage of systems for
their own benefit. This happens everywhere and the business world is probably the most
relevant example of this practice, where system failures are massively exploited to generate
huge profits. The virtual world is not an exception, being a field for the development of
several malicious activities. Networks had a great development in the last decades, reaching
a complexity and robustness level that conducted to their wide usage. Internet is the best
example of the importance that networks have acquired. Some typical applications of networks
are data exchange, communication, entertainment and business. Due to the variety of usage
profiles and information that is exchanged between devices, it is normal that malicious people
have developed ways to bypass network security in order to obtain secret information or simply
damage networks.
In general, the act of inducing damage on a network is called network attack. There are
different types of network attacks, developed to achieve different goals. There are passive
attacks, where important information is monitored, and active attacks that intend to corrupt
or even destroy important data or the network itself. This dissertation is focused on a specific
type of network attack: the spoofing attack. Spoofing consists on the creation of a misleading
context in order to lead a victim to make decisions that it will allow gaining access to restricted
resources and stealing information [32]. This context can take a variety of forms but it
is always based in a scenario in which the attacker pretends to be someone else, usually
an authorized client, to have access to certain resources that it wouldn’t normally have.
Depending on the information the intruder impersonates, there are specific cases of spoofing
attacks. Again, for the purpose of this dissertation, two particular cases of spoofing attacks
were studied: MAC spoofing attacks and IP spoofing attacks.
The Data Link Layer (Layer 2) of the OSI model uses MAC addresses to identify and
provide communication between the different devices of a LAN. The exchanged data inside
networks is divide into packets. To know where the packets come from and what are their
destinations, the network devices make use of MAC addresses to identify the computers and
ensure information is correctly delivered. A MAC address is a permanent address assigned
to each network interface of any network device (NIC cards, Wireless adapters, etc) by the
hardware manufacturer. These physical addresses are globally unique for each interface and
any device connected to a network is identified by the interface MAC address it is using
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[33]. Even though it is supposed to be permanent, it is possible to change the assigned
MAC address. This is actually the basic principle of MAC spoofing attacks. MAC spoofing
consists of changing the MAC address associated to a NIC card, for example, to impersonate
another network device or to hide a computer on the network [34, 35]. This will allow
bypassing the access control list of servers or routers. The MAC address can also be changed
for legitimate reasons, for example to connect to WI-FI hotspots where the internet service
provider bind their services to a specific MAC address. However, the focus of this dissertation
is the development of measures to detect MAC spoofing attacks, performed for non-legitimate
reasons.
Beyond the MAC address, each computer is also identified by an IP address. The Internet
Protocol works over the network layer (Layer 3) and routers use these addresses to route data
packets across the networks and to provide communication between devices. Thus, in order
to identify the origin and destination of information, IP addresses from the corresponding
computers are included in the data packets. So, basically, while devices like switches work
over Layer 2 and use MAC addresses to forward packets, Layer 3 devices make use of IP
addresses to route the packets over different networks. Unlike MAC addresses, IP addresses
are not defined and assigned to a device interface during its fabrication. Instead, these
addresses are manually configured or assigned by a DHCP server on each device interface
according to the network where it is connected to. Thus, changing the IP address associated
to a computer interface is a relatively simple process. This is also the main principle of
IP spoofing attacks. IP spoofing is defined as the process of configuring a host with the
same IP address of a computer with legitimate and authorized access to certain information
and resources. As happens in spoofing attacks in general, here the attacker changes his IP
address to impersonate a user and gain unauthorized access [36, 37]. This type of attacks is
more directed to communication between distant computers because routers are responsible
for routing the packets by analyzing the destination address but, generally, they ignore the
originating address, which is only used by the destination computer to answer back to the
source. The destination host will believe that the messages come from a trustful source and
this is actually the essence of IP spoofing attacks.
MAC spoofing and IP spoofing are relatively similar network attacks, with the difference
that each one gets access to restricted information using different data to impersonate an
authorized user. While to perform a MAC spoofing attack the intruder changes the MAC
address of his host in order to match the MAC address of a legitimate client’s host, on IP
spoofing attacks the attacker uses the IP address to fool the victim. In the next section,
different approaches to detect these types of network attacks will be presented .
3.2 Attack Detection Methodologies
The previous section made a description of spoofing attacks, in particular, MAC spoofing
and IP spoofing. It explained in what these attacks consist and how they are performed.
Due to the appearance of these security threats against networks, it was necessary to develop
applications that could detect them. One of the objectives of this dissertation is precisely the
creation of methodologies for the detection of these two types of spoofing attacks. Thus, since
they were already defined, it is important to know the different approaches that can be taken
in order to develop counter-measures against these network attacks. Having this in mind,
different solutions can be found to solve this problem. This section will discuss two general
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methodologies for the detection of spoofing attacks: from the network point of view, there
can be a local and a distributed approach. Then, each approach will be described, as well as
how it can be deployed. Besides, some already developed methodologies that use each one of
the approaches will also be presented. Taking a look to other projects that have already been
developed and focus on the same subject will allow to create the basis for the work that will
be presented in later chapters for spoofing attack detection.
3.2.1 Local
The first method that will be presented for the detection of spoofing attacks is the local
approach. In general, the local method consists on adding probes in specific places of the
network. These probes will perform specific tasks defined by the developed methodology, for
example, capture data packets that pass through that point of the network and analyze the
information that it contains in order to detect network attacks. So, an attacker can send
spoofed packets to the network, but this approach will only detect the spoofing attack on well
defined locations. To have a better knowledge of this approach, we will now present some
already developed and implemented methodologies.
Referring to the detection of MAC spoofing attacks, a paper that uses this local approach
is called ”A design of egress NAC using an authentication visa checking mechanism to protect
against MAC address spoofing attacks” [38]. An egress NAC is used to authenticate internal
users before accessing external networks by protecting and controlling them when browsing
the Internet, for example. It is mostly used on WI-FI hotspots, but it can also be used on
wired connections using Ethernet ports. MAC spoofing can easily bypass the egress NAC
by spoofing the MAC address of an authenticated client and getting access to the network.
This paper proposes new egress NAC based on an authentication visa checking mechanism to
solve this problem. Normal NACs use IP and MAC addresses to identify the authenticated
clients, which can be fooled if an attacker spoofs these addresses. The authentication visa
created in this paper uses messages generated by a security agent applet as an additional
factor to validate users. So, this methodology can be considered as a local approach to detect
spoofing attacks because the new NAC is placed in a specific point of the network to verify
the authenticated clients.
Anther developed methodology that uses a local approach, but now for detection of IP
spoofing attacks, is presented in a paper named ”Defense Against Spoofed IP Traffic Using
Hop-Count Filtering” and is based on the fact that even though an attacker can forge any field
of the IP header, he cannot fake the number of hops an IP packet takes to reach its destination
[39]. Thus, when an intruder spoofs an IP address, he will not be able to manipulate the
hop-count for the same value of the victim. Due to the ease that an Internet server has
to obtain the hop-count information from the TTL field of the IP header, it is possible to
create a map of IP addresses and their correspondent hop-counts in order to detect spoofed
IP packets. This filtering technique is called HCF and uses an IP2HC mapping table that
will detect and discard spoofed IP packets. This is another example of a local approach for
the detection of IP spoofing attacks, where the filtering system is placed near the possible
victim of the attack, like a server or another host, in order to avoid that it could damage this
specific device.
Next paper, entitled ”VASE: Filtering IP spoofing traffic with agility”, basically proposes
another method to perform IP spoofing filtering with a reduced resource consumption, which
will be proportional to the size of the attack [40]. The filtering mechanism is called VASE
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and it uses sampling and on-demand filter configuration to detect IP spoofing attacks and,
at the same time, reduce unnecessary overhead due to the existence of intermittent attacks.
3.2.2 Distributed
The other approach that could be taken to detect spoofing attacks, or any malicious
activity in general, is a distributed one. Unlike the local approach, which analyzes a specific
location of the network, the distributed approach is able to analyze data packets in different
points or analyze many network devices in order to detect network attacks. This allows to
detect the presence of spoofing attacks in any location of the network, protecting the whole
network instead of a single device. Let us now mention some projects that were developed
using this approach.
Paper ”Network Simulation for MAC Spoofing Detection, using DTF Method” [41] pro-
poses a method to detect MAC spoofing attacks. As the title says, this paper proposes a
MAC spoofing detection methodology based on a DTF. The general idea of this method is to
generate traffic from an end device connected to the network to a set of IP destinations. Each
destination will have a constant traffic in time that will be used as a reference fingerprint.
For each fingerprint, the IP address and the percentage of traffic from that destination are
recorded. The reference fingerprint is compared to the actual fingerprint and the method
establishes the Overall Degree of Recognition that will determine if a MAC address is being
spoofed or not. Obviously, this method uses a distributed approach for the detection of MAC
spoofing attacks because information is obtained from different end hosts, which will allow to
detect if any of them is performing an attack.
A paper that uses a distributed approach to deal with IP spoofing attacks is titled ”A
Trust-based Approach against IP-spoofing Attacks” [42]. This paper proposes a method based
on a Bayesian inference model to detect attacks performed by access routers. Most of the
detection mechanisms assume that IP spoofed packets are generated only by end hosts, but
the truth is that even though they send genuine traffic, access routers can modify the source
IP address of the packets before forwarding them. This model evaluates the trustworthiness
of the routers based on the number of detected IP spoofed packets through the application
of the referred inference model by a judge router. Each access router sends a copy of every
packet they forward to this judge router, which computes the trust values for them. This
methodology also avoids that IP spoofed packets travel the network to reach the destination
by performing the attack detection on the source side, reducing wasted network resources.
This methodology can be considered as a distributed approach to detect IP spoofing attacks
because it analyzes packets forwarded by all access routers and detects attacks performed at
any point of the network, instead of analyzing a specific location.
At last, an approach named ”An Effective Method for Defense against IP Spoofing Attack”
is based on traceroute and cooperation between trusted adjacent nodes in order to detect and
block intruders from external networks [43]. Without entering in detail on this method, it
can be immediately seen that this is a distributed approach because different network nodes
are analyzed, which means that many network probes are placed over the network to perform
the IP spoofing detection.
In summary, the local approach can be considered a passive method on the detection of
network attacks. In general, it consists on a packet filtering placed in a specific point of the
network that continually analyzes the data packets that pass through it until a spoofed packet
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is detected and discarded. On the other hand, the distributed approach has a more active
role on the detection of spoofing attacks. This methodology analyzes different locations of
the network, seeking for the attacks instead of waiting for them in a specific point. Both
approaches have advantages and disadvantages: the local methodology leads to less usage of
resources but the distributed approach is more efficient on the detection and blocking of the
attacks. For the purpose of this dissertation, the SNMP protocol will be used to perform
network discovery and detection of MAC spoofing and IP spoofing attacks. This protocol
will retrieve information from the different network devices, which will be used to develop the
monitoring methodologies. So, in this method, each network device will work as a probe and
the approach that will be presented for the detection of spoofing attacks is a distributed one.
3.3 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
An Intrusion Detection System is an application developed to monitor network traffic
and look for malicious activities. These security monitoring systems gather and analyze data
from many network locations in order to identify and detect possible system intrusions and
misuses. An intrusion is considered as an attack performed from outside the network and,
therefore, outside the organization, while a misuse is an intrusion generated from inside [44].
An IDS is focused on the detection of network attacks from both inside and outside and, in
some cases, it may also take some actions and block the source of the attacks.
There are different variants of IDS that deal with the detection of suspicious traffic in
different ways. These systems can be grouped in two types: Network based IDS and Host
based IDS. As the name suggests, while the first one is placed in strategic places within the
network to monitor all the devices on the system, the second type is run inside hosts or network
equipment to protect only that specific device. Additionally, an IDS can also be categorized
according to its detection mechanism: signature based IDSs, anomaly based IDSs and hybrid
IDSs. The signature based IDS monitors the network packets and performs the detection
based on a comparison of the traffic with specific signatures and attributes of already known
threats. The anomaly based IDS establishes a pattern based on the bandwidth, used protocols
and ports that are considered normal for each network, monitoring the network traffic and
comparing it to this baseline. Finally, hybrid systems combine both IDS mechanisms [45].
Depending on the type of IDS, different tasks will be performed. But in general, an IDS
includes the following functionalities:
• Monitoring and analyzing both user and system activities;
• Analyzing system configurations and vulnerabilities;
• Assessing system and file integrity;
• Ability to recognize patterns of typical attacks;
• Analysis of abnormal activity patterns;
• Tracking user policy violations.
Next, we will analyze some free and open source IDS developed to protect networks and,
according to the context of this dissertation, allow the detection of spoofing attacks.
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3.3.1 Snort
One of the most used free and open-source applications for network protection is Snort,
developed by Sourcefire [46]. From the previously mentioned types of IDS, Snort belongs
to NIDS. It is considered a lightweight tool, which means that it is a small, powerfull and
flexible IDS in order to be easily deployed and a permanent element of the network security
infrastructure. In terms of application, Snort is a cross-platform and can be deployed on small
TCP/IP networks to detect suspicious network traffic and non-legitimate network attacks
without the need for monitoring or administrative maintenance during long periods. Initially,
Snort wasn’t developed to work as a complete IDS, instead it was developed as a supplement
to other IDSs in order to fill some security gaps they could have [47]. However, Snort has been
developed and it has increased without leaving the concept of a small application (∼ 75,000
code lines) with a minimal interference in the system and network performance. Comparing
with most commercial NIDS, Snort is easier to configure by network administrators and
doesn’t require a dedicated platform, which leads to a more rapidly implementation and easy
to use network security solution. Snort has three execution modes:
• Sniffer mode;
• Packet logger mode;
• Intrusion detection mode.
The sniffer mode allows to read network packets and to display the data contained in the
header and body of each packet to the screen. The packet logger mode will basically log the
network packets to the disk. Sniffer and packet logger modes have similar functionalities, in
which network packets are analysed, with the difference that the first mode writes the data
into the screen and the second into the hard drive of the host where it is being executed.
These two running modes are suitable on data capture but it is not practical to use this
information to detect network intrusions or misuses. For this reason, Snort also includes
the intrusion detection mode. In this mode, the user defines a set of rules and the program
monitors and analyses the network traffic based on these rules. Then, if some suspicious
activity is detected, the system will apply specific counter-measures [48]. According to the
defined rules, it is possible to detect a wide variety of intrusions and attacks and this last
mode is precisely the one that it is more related with the purpose of the dissertation.
Thus, Snort is more like a rule based than a signature based IDS, providing a simple
but efficient way to protect networks against intrusions and attacks. So, the methodologies
presented on this dissertation should represent a reliable alternative to this tool.
3.3.2 NFR
One of the most complete IDS in the market is NFR. This software was developed to track
attempted break-ins in a system or server from a separated computer, which means that even
if the system we are protecting is destroyed or becomes unavailable, NFR always survives. It
uses a hybrid based approach, inspecting the OSI model, from Layer 2 up to Layer 7, looking
for any suspicious activity [48]. As any other sniffer, NFR provides data analysis and collection
by reading the network packets but, in addition, it uses a scripting open-source language called
N-Code to perform a complete packet inspection in order to detect network misuses, protocol
anomalies and network intrusions [49]. N-Code is a very flexible programming language that
22
works as a filtering engine that will allow users to configure this IDS in order to sample
great portions of network traffic and perform reasonable packet analysis before choosing to
record it and evaluate possible network attacks. Thus, this language gives NFR the necessary
extensibility for the creation of automated real-time alerts and management tasks.
NFR is an open-source software but it is only free for noncommercial and research pur-
poses. This IDS gives the user the possibility of customizing the software according to their
protection needs and authors have also created some more intelligent and programmable tools
for network monitoring that allow to detect network attacks in a more efficient way [50]. Un-
like Snort, for example, NFR can be applied on large networks and its filters occupy very little
memory which, combined with its customizable configuration, turns this IDS into a powerful
a very flexible tool for a complete network protection.
3.3.3 Emerald
The last IDS that will be presented is called EMERALD. This software is an example of
a distributed IDS using both signature and anomaly-based approaches for the detection and
tracking of malicious activities. Like NFR, it was developed for large networks with thousands
of users connected and providing real-time responses [51]. EMERALD is also a very scalable
tool allowing network surveillance, attack isolation and response monitors that are deployed
at various abstraction layers. These monitors combine signature analysis with probabilistic
inference to protect systems in real-time. The EMERALD project developed an architecture
with well-developed analytical techniques in order to detect different network intrusions and
to cast them in frameworks, which are highly reusable and interoperable [52, 48].
This chapter started by defining one type of security threat against networks: spoofing
attacks. The network protection tools developed on this project are focused on this type of
attack. Then, two general approaches for the detection of malicious activities were presented
in order to have a better idea of the possible approaches that can be taken for the development
of methodologies for detecting spoofing attacks. Finally, it was presented three open-source
and free IDS that use different methods to protect networks against intrusions and misuses.
These IDSs provide a complete set of tools to detect attacks and monitor network packets;
although the developed work consists only on a small part of all the tasks these tools can
perform, it can be a reliable alternative to these solutions on this specific task.
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Chapter 4
Developed Network Discovery
Algorithm
As previously said, SNMP executes specific commands from a host in order to access the
MIB of the different devices present on the network. The necessary information is selected
and manipulated to create algorithms that will perform the desired network monitoring tasks.
The first one that was developed, and is described in this chapter, is the network discovery
algorithm. This algorithm not only finds all Layer 2 and Layer 3 devices, but also gathers
useful information about them and the network and records this data into a database so it
can be available for monitoring purposes.
To detect spoofing attacks against the network using SNMP, the information contained in
each device MIB should also be manipulated. This information will allow detecting the attacks
and blocking them. This means that, before the network attack detection, it is necessary to
know all devices present in the network because the algorithm needs to know which devices
have to be analyzed. So, the network discovery algorithm presented in this chapter can
work not only as an individual network monitoring tool but also as a supporting tool for the
detection of spoofing attacks, by providing information about the network equipment.
For the purpose of this dissertation, this algorithm is prepared to be deployed only on
networks using Cisco network devices. As previously mentioned, different equipment manu-
facturers have different MIBs and the algorithm was developed for Cisco MIBs. To deploy
this method on different equipment, we only have to change the code according to the MIB
objects of the corresponding manufacturer and it should work well. Thus, the network dis-
covery algorithm described in this chapter intends to work as a network monitoring tool for
Cisco devices and it also provides the necessary information for the correct execution of the
spoofing attack detection algorithm presented in the next chapter.
The first section of this chapter will describe the procedure/algorithm that was proposed
for network discovery. Then, some limitations of this method and some considerations that
have to be taken into account when using this algorithm are presented. Finally, the last
section explains one possible implementation for this algorithm and the one that was used for
test purposes.
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4.1 Algorithm Description
The developed mechanism to discover the whole network is illustrated on Figure 4.1. It
starts by accessing an already known router in the network using its IP address. From this
router, it retrieves information from its MIB using the SNMP ”snmpwalk” command, putting
it in an array that can be easily accessed later. First, it retrieves information about the
host name and the model of the device. This information is obtained using the MIB objects
hostName (OID .1.3.6.1.4.1.9.2.1.3) and sysObjectID (OID .1.3.6.1.2.1.1.2), respectively. By
joining this device data to the IP address of the router that was inserted at the beginning,
we have the necessary information to characterize the device.
Figure 4.1: Network Discovery Mechanism
Then, it will retrieve information about the routing table of the router. This data is
obtained from the MIB objects shown in Table 2.2, which contains information about des-
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tination networks, network masks, next-hop IP addresses, used interfaces, route types and
route metrics. Actually, the MIB object related to the interface used to reach a certain net-
work only returns the interface index. Thus, the ifDescr MIB object (OID .1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.2)
can be used to obtain the corresponding interface name. Furthermore, if the route type for
each destination network is not direct, it is possible to use the next-hop IP addresses and the
corresponding host names to know to which routers is this device connected to. However,
since next-hop IP addresses define a packet route to reach a destination network, if the ana-
lyzed router is connected to another router that is not defined as next-hop to any destination
network, it won’t be possible to discover the connection between both.
The information from the MIB objects represented in Table 2.3 is used to get the device
ARP table. These objects contain information about the IP addresses corresponding to
the media-dependent physical addresses, as well as the associated address types (static or
dynamic), MAC addresses and interfaces [53, 54, 55]. Again, the ifDescr MIB object is used
to get the actual interface name.
A situation that has to be considered in this method is the fact that each router can have
several IP addresses associated to each interface. When performing network discovery, each
device only needs to be analyzed once; however, since it can have more than one IP address,
the algorithm could analyze the same router more than once. This is why the next step is
to record all IP addresses associated to each interface in order to assure that the device is
analyzed only once. This information is found in the router MIB object ipAdEntAddr (OID
.1.3.6.1.2.1.4.20.1.1). To associate each of the IP addresses to the right interface, the MIB
object ifDescr is used , after the corresponding interface indexes have been retrieved using
the ipAdEntIfIndex (OID .1.3.6.1.2.1.4.20.1.2) object.
The previous steps and all the mentioned MIB objects contain the necessary information
about each router and all this data must be retrieved every time a router is analyzed. To have
this information available for a posterior use on monitoring tasks, for example, it is recorded on
a database. In order to move to the next network device, the destination networks previously
retrieved from the router MIB are used. For each destination network, the algorithm must
check the route type. If the route type to that network is indirect, the value of the next-hop
IP address is read and the algorithm moves to the router with this IP address, following all
the previous steps. Since this is the first router, it is possible to move to the next device
without checking if it was already analyzed. However, from now on it is necessary to compare
the next-hop IP address with the list of IP addresses corresponding to the devices where we
have already been. If the route type to a destination network is direct, the IP addresses of all
Layer 2 devices present on that network must be read. The IP addresses from these devices
can be found on the already retrieved ipNetToMediaNetAddress MIB object. Whenever the
algorithm finds in the list an IP address corresponding to a network device that was not
already analyzed and whose address type is defined as dynamic (because static IP addresses
usually belong to the interfaces of the device that it is being analyzed), then the algorithm
moves to this new network device. After all Layer 2 devices present on a given network
have been analyzed, then the next destination network from the array is read and the route
type is checked again. Since this is a recursive algorithm, when there are no more destination
networks to reach, we must go back to the previous router that was being analyzed. When the
first router that was analyzed is finally reached and there are no more destination networks
to move to or Layer 2 devices to analyze in a given network, then it means that all network
devices have been discovered. Additionally, it is possible to define a stopping network for
cases in which it is not desired that the network discovery algorithm discovers all networks.
27
Thus, when the list of destination networks from a certain router is being analyzed and the
stopping one is detected, the algorithm was defined to ignore this network and proceed to the
next destination network from the list.
In the case of Layer 2 devices the task is much simpler. When a router is performing
the task of analyzing the list of devices belonging to a directly connected network from the
ipNetToMediaNetAddress MIB object and a Switch or AP that was not analyzed is found,
the algorithm has simply to move there, retrieve the necessary information and then go back
to the router and read the next IP address from the list. So, the first thing to do with Layer
2 devices is to record the information that characterizes the device. Similarly to the case of
routers, here the recorded information is also the IP address, the device hostname and the
device model. Then, information from the device forwarding table will be retrieved. This can
be done by retrieving information from the MIB objects represented on Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Some MIB objects from Cisco BRIDGE-MIB and CISCO-STACK-MIB
MIB Object OID
dot1dTdbAddress .1.3.6.1.2.1.17.4.3.1.1
dot1dTpFdbPort .1.3.6.1.2.1.17.4.3.1.2
dpt1dBasePortIfIndex .1.3.6.1.2.1.17.1.4.1.2
vlanPortlslOperStatus .1.3.6.1.4.1.9.5.1.9.3.1.8
The first two objects represent, respectively, the MAC addresses and the correspond-
ing bridge ports from the MAC address table of the device. To convert the bridge port
into the actual device interface, the next MIB object from the table should be used. The
dot1dBasePortIfIndex object allows to get the actual interface index, which can be associated
to the interface name using the ifDescr (OID .1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.2) object [56]. Then, to obtain
the types of the addresses (dynamic or static) and the VLAN associated to each one, the
ipNetToMediaType and atIfIndex objects (Table 2.3) are used . The second one is used as
index on the ifDescr object to return the corresponding VLAN. Finally, using the vlanPortl-
slOperStatus MIB object, the last one from Table 4.1, it is possible to verify if the bridge
port is a Trunk port or an Access port. This process allows retrieving the same information
that is obtained when the ”show mac-address-table” command is executed in Cisco Layer
2 devices. After the previous steps are executed, the algorithm returns to the router and
continues looking for other Layer 2 equipment on that LAN.
We have just described a method that will perform network equipment discovery in any
network, using SNMP as the support protocol that allows obtaining the necessary information
from each device. When running the algorithm, all Layer 2 and Layer 3 devices present on
the network will be discovered and the necessary information that characterizes each device is
retrieved. This methodology will also obtain other network information like forwarding tables
from Layer 2 devices and routing and ARP tables from Layer 3 equipment. Additionally, it
also discovers how routers are connected and retrieves information about each interface. Ob-
viously, more information can be obtained from each device MIB but this algorithm presents
a method to consult the most useful information in order to support network monitoring.
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4.2 Considerations and Limitations of this Method
The previous section described a method to discover network devices. This is an efficient
method that, theoretically, can be deployed in any network. But due to the existence of
different network equipment, some situations have to be considered in order to have a general
algorithm that can be applied anywhere. This variety of devices may also bring some limita-
tions to this method. In this section, we will describe and explain some of these situations.
Although most of the network devices support the SNMP protocol, there are still some
exceptions. For a correct deployment of this method, it will be considered that all Layer 3
devices support SNMP. Otherwise, the network is not correctly discovered and other devices
on the network may not be found. However, it is possible to have managed Layer 2 devices
(devices that support SNMP) and unmanaged ones. If a network has any unmanaged switch
or AP, it won’t be detected by the network discovery mechanism but it won’t have any other
consequence on the discovery of the remaining network. To solve this problem a counter can
be created to check how many Layer 2 devices the algorithm analyzes in a certain LAN. This
counter will obviously count the number of managed devices. On a managed switch, the
atPhysAddress MIB object can be used to count the number of Layer 2 devices present in the
LAN (even the unmanaged ones). The difference between the two counters corresponds to
the number of unmanaged devices. This way, these unmanaged devices should be manually
checked every time a MAC spoofing or IP spoofing attack cannot be blocked through the
method described in the next chapter.
Another point that has to be taken into account is the fact that Layer 2 devices include, for
example, switches or APs. They have different characteristics and consequently they must be
treated differently. In this project, the procedure to discover networks in cases that switches
are the only Layer 2 devices present in the network was studied in detail. If there is any
Layer 2 device of a different type, the steps to be followed should be the same as it was for
switches. The only difference could be on the MIB object that must be retrieved because, as
previously said, different network equipment can have different MIBs.
Finally, it is important to refer the case of routers using a switch module. Although they
are routers by default, they can work like switches and have exactly the same behavior. They
can also be accessed via SNMP and its information can be obtained similarly to any other
network device. But during this project it was seen that most of these devices have a lack
of information on their MIBs, which do not allow retrieving the necessary information from
this type of devices as it is done for normal switches. For this reason, any router using a
EtherSwitch card will be considered as an unmanaged switch.
4.3 Algorithm Implementation
Now that a complete description of the developed method and its limitations was made, it’s
time to explain how it was actual implemented in practice. Since the basis of this dissertation
is the development of a few scripts to perform specific network monitoring tasks, the choice
of the programming language was a crucial part of the project planning. The used operating
system was Ubuntu and high-level and scripting languages are the most appropriate languages
for the purpose of this work because interaction with the hardware and memory is not needed,
they are object-oriented and provide an abstraction level that turns the scripting simpler
and more robust [57]. The most commonly used scripting languages, and those that were
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considered as options, were Bash, Python, Perl, Ruby and Javascript. For antiquity and
compatibility reasons, Bash was the chosen scripting language. Bash is a Unix shell for the
GNU project, which means that this language is at the same time a command interpreter that
provides the user with an interface to interact with the operating system and a programming
language with its own syntax that allows a user to write scripts with the ability to read
commands directly from a file [58, 59]. As a consequence, Bash can be considered not only a
scripting language like all the other mentioned languages but also a command line interpreter
(shell) for GNU operating systems (UNIX-like computer operating systems) and the developed
algorithms were based on this language.
As it has been said, the network discovery algorithm retrieves information from the differ-
ent network devices. This information goes from the characteristics of the devices to network
information like forwarding tables and ARP tables. In order to record and maintain the
information for a posterior use, a database system was used. From the available options
for database systems, only SQL databases were considered due to ease-of-use, support and
administration reasons [60, 61]. In particular, the two most popular and used open source
database systems are PostgreSQL and MySQL. From these, the choice for the deployment
of this project was MySQL [62, 63]. MySQL is considered a fast, reliable and easy to use
database system and it runs on a server providing multi-user access to a number of databases.
Thus, it is commonly used on the development of web applications by making part of LAMP,
the software bundle used for web development that also includes Linux, Apache and a high-
level programming language like Perl, PHP or Python. MySQL is used by several high-traffic
websites to perform data storage and logging of user data, which is a signal of its reliability.
Referring to administration tools for MySQL, phpMyAdmin is one of the most used tools.
phpMyAdmin is a free software written in PHP to manage MySQL database systems by
providing an intuitive web interface with the ability to directly execute SQL statements and
import or export data in different formats [64]. For the purpose of this project it was decided
to use a MySQL database system instead of PostgreSQL due to its really well-supported doc-
umentation and reference manuals and due to the reason that it is the widely used database
system for web development, allowing the project to be easily improved in the future with
new features. phpMyAdmin was also adopted to manage and administrate the data retrieved
from the network devices.
To have a complete network discovery algorithm, many scripts were developed. To start,
we created a Bash script where the user provides all the information needed during the
discovery process. Thus, this script doesn’t execute any action over the network and was
merely developed to introduce necessary information. First the user introduces the IP address
of any interface of any router present on the network. This IP address is used as one of the
parameters in the SNMP commands executed from the local machine and it works as a starting
point to access one of the network devices. Later, the algorithm will use the information of
this router to move to other devices. Then, it is asked if the user wants to discover the whole
network or not. The router IP address and, if case, the stopping network are all the necessary
information about the network.
Then, MySQL account information is required to allow the algorithm to create and ma-
nipulate a database where the information will be recorded. As will be seen, we created
a script to automatically perform this task, so the next step is to introduce the username
and password from a MySQL account that the user had already created. Finally, SNMP
information is needed. SNMP provides the remote interaction between the local machine and
the network equipment. The local computer will work as the manager or client, while each
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network device works as an agent which means that they must be configured as an SNMP
server. The algorithm was developed in order to work with both versions 2 and 3 of SNMP.
This gives the user the freedom to choose the version that better fits his interests. So, the
user should insert the SNMP version that it was configured on the network equipment to pro-
vide compatibility with the SNMP commands executed from the local computer. If the user
chooses the version 2 of SNMP, then the community string configured on the devices should
be introduced. Otherwise, in case of version 3, the username and authentication password are
required. After all the previous information have been requested and introduced by the user
according to his network and his MySQL account, another script will be executed in order to
perform the complete network discovery.
Thus, two Bash scripts were created to perform the actual discovery of the network. These
scripts have exactly the same content, except on the format of the SNMP commands. One is
directed to SNMP version 2 and the other to version 3. The SNMP commands format is as
follows:
• Version 2: snmpwalk v2c c [Community String] [Host IP Address] [MIB Object];
• Version 3: snmpwalk -v3 -u [Username] A [Password] -l authnopriv [Host IP Address]
[MIB Object].
The correct script is selected according to the SNMP version introduced by the user. As it
can be seen on the above commands, in the first script it was already provided the necessary
information for its execution, with the exception of the MIB object, which is mainly what this
script will be dealing with. The methodology described on the first section of this chapter will
be executed in practice by this script. Many auxiliary text files are used during the execution
of this script, thus, the first step is to read the information introduced on the previous script
and delete old information that could be contained on these text files. Then, a function called
AnalyzeDevice is executed. This function will be executed each time a new device is analyzed.
It starts by verifing the type of the device (router or switch). There are many ways to identify
the device but the chosen one was through the MIB object sysObjectID (OID .1.3.6.1.2.1.1.2),
which returns a specific number sequence that identifies the device [65]. As it can be seen, in
practice, the ”snmpwalk” is the SNMP command used to obtain this information and it will
also be used to retrieve most of the information contained in each device MIB. However, it
returns more information than what is necessary. For this reason, the ”snmpwalk” command
is combined with a ”cut” command to exclusively select the useful information. According
to the type of device, the corresponding function is executed. In case of a router, the first
step is to retrieve all the necessary MIB information from the device by executing a function
called Device Router. These MIB objects were described in the first section of this chapter
and they are represented in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3. Since each one of these objects returns
a list of results, this information is written into arrays.
The next steps consist of writing this information into temporary text files so it can be
recorded later on the database and printed in a readable way for the user. This way, when
running the algorithm, it is possible to immediately consult the routing table, ARP table
and IP addresses from all the interfaces of the router. Then, with all information saved on
auxiliary files, it is necessary to move to another network device. The method was already
explained in detail, so it’s easy to follow the proceeding by reading destination networks,
routing types and so on, from the arrays. In case of an indirect destination network, when
the next-hop IP address has not already been analyzed, the IP address of the current router is
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recorded, a variable assumes the value of that address and function AnalyzeDevice is executed.
This way, SNMP commands will be sent to this new host. When the function returns to the
first router, its recorded IP address is restored and function Device Router is executed so the
MIB information is available again.
For the case of directly connected networks the steps were also described in the first section
and it is only necessary to use information contained in the arrays. When moving into a Layer
2 device the procedure is the same of the routers with only one difference. The MIB object
ipNetToMediaNetAddress contain IP addresses from routers, Layer 2 devices (managed and
unmanaged) and end hosts. When executing a SNMP command to an unmanaged device
or end device it will return an error and it will try to access it again periodically. To avoid
this situation and because we are not interested in these devices, the solution is to send a
”snmpget” command with a random MIB object (sysDescr, in the case) for the IP address
of the unmanaged device and wait 1 second. If after this second there is an answer, it means
that we are ahead of a managed Layer 2 device. Otherwise, it is an unmanaged device or an
end device and this IP address is simply skipped. This could be a rough way of dealing with
this situation but it is actually efficient and that’s why it was kept like this. When moving
to a Layer 2 device the current IP is saved and then restored when we come back. Also the
Device Router function is executed again. For the case the network device is identified as
a switch, function Switch is executed. As in case of routers, the first step is to retrieve the
necessary information from its MIB, which is done with function Device Switch. The MIB
objects were represented on Table 4.1 and the proceeding to select useful information was also
described. Information about the device and its MAC Address Table is written into text files
to be recorded later and the table is organized and printed to be readable when the algorithm
is executed. Then, the algorithm returns to the previous router and the process continues.
When function AnalyzeDevice returns to the first analyzed router and reaches its end, two
other scripts are executed. These are two PHP scripts developed in order to save information
in a database. The first one is dedicated to the creation of the database and subsequent
tables. It uses the MySQL account information provided on the first script to connect to the
database server. The database server address was maintained as default (127.0.0.1) and the
name of the database was simply defined as ”network”. It was decided to define the same
name to any user to keep the algorithm as simple as possible and also because there are
no advantages of changing it. Using a SQL command the connection is established. After
connecting to the database server, the script will check if a database with the name ”network”
already exists. If not, a new database is created. Otherwise, it will delete it and create a new
one. This is a rough but efficient way to ensure that only updated information is available
on the database, while the old one is released. After the database has been created, tables
where information will be recorded are created . A table with information about the devices
is created, a Routing table, an ARP table, a MAC Address table and a table with all the
IP addresses from each interface of the routers. Thus, this first PHP script has simply a
supporting functionality for the creation of databases and tables.
The other PHP script was developed to fill the tables with the information retrieved from
the network equipment. Again, the connection to the database server is established with the
provided username and password and the ”network” database is selected. As it was said, all
information retrieved from the devices was written in text files. So, the first step is to read all
auxiliary text files with information about the devices and insert it in the devices table. This
table will allow to identify and to distinguish all network equipment present on the network.
Then, for each one of these devices the text files containing the information associated to
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them will be read . Finally, after all data has been inserted on the correct table, all auxiliary
text files containing information are deleted. In the first section of this chapter we made a
general description of this method for network discovey and now we described the practical
implementation of the whole algorithm.
In summary, the first 3 scripts combined form an efficient algorithm that uses the SNMP
protocol to discover all network equipment and retrieve useful information. Then, the last
2 scripts record this information into a database so it can be available for monitoring tasks.
During this chapter, the developed method for network discovery was presented in detail,
as well as the limitations of the algorithm and how it was implemented. After running this
algorithm, any network equipment that supports SNMP is known and we can now move to
the next chapter where we will describe the method to detect spoofing attacks.
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Chapter 5
Developed Spoofing Attack
Detection Algorithms
The previous chapter described a method to discover all network devices present in a
network, in particular, Layer 2 and Layer 3 devices that support SNMP. After running the
network discovery algorithm, all network devices become known to the local machine that is
monitoring the network. This allows to perform other monitoring tasks.
The objective of this project is the development of several methodologies for network
monitoring and the following approach that will be presented is focused on network security
and protection. Most networks are exposed to a variety of malicious activities, so protecting
them against these security threats is essential for a secure and trustful system. A definition
of spoofing, which is a common type of network attack, was already given in a previous
chapter. Some approaches to protect the system against these threats were also discussed.
This chapter presents a methodology, which uses a distributed approach, for the detection of
spoofing attacks, in particular MAC and IP spoofing attacks. As in the network discovery
algorithm, SNMP is also the basis of the proposed method but, due to different characteristics
of both attacks, different procedures should be taken in order to detect them. A solution to
block these attacks when they are detected will also be discussed.
Before presenting the method, it is important to make some considerations about it. The
first one has to do with Layer 2 devices and its characteristics. In case of switches, they have
different ports and each one is used by a unique device to connect to it. On another hand, an
AP has a wireless interface that is used by many devices at same time. Thus, for the proposed
method we will describe in detail the steps for the detection and blocking of spoofing attacks,
in case the attacker is accessing the network from a switch. In this case, the port where he
is connected to must be blocked. If we are dealing with an attack triggered from an access
point, then the attack can only be detected when it belongs to the IP spoofing attack type.
This is due to the fact that, using this method, MAC spoofing attacks are detected based
on the MAC address and interface that the intruder is using to access the network. In case
the attacker is accessing the network from the same access point of the authorized client,
there is no way to distinguish between them because they are using the same MAC address
and the same interface. Thus, when performing MAC spoofing detection, APs are considered
unmanaged devices. That situation does not happen on IP spoofing attacks because in this
case the task is to find similar IP addresses and once this happens, the MAC address of the
intruder is immediately found. Then, the problem consists only of finding it on the network
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and blocking it. If the attacker is accessing the network from an AP, the procedure is similar
to the switches’ case but, instead of blocking the interface that the attacker is using (the
wireless interface), the MAC address of the host he is using to perform the attack is blocked;
otherwise, the other devices that are using the interface could not access the network anymore.
Blocking the access of a MAC address of a certain end host to an AP must be done manually
via SSH, for example, through the MAC ACL of the AP.
The other limitation of this method is the fact that, when discovering the network, there
could be some unmanaged devices, as was mentioned in the previous chapter. This means that
if the attacker is accessing the network from one of these unmanaged devices, the following
method will be able to detect the attack but it won’t be able to block it. As a consequence,
if a spoofing attack is detected but it’s not blocked, the user must check manually all the
unmanaged devices because most certainly the intruder is performing the attack from one of
these hosts.
This chapter is divided into two sections; one directed for MAC spoofing attacks and the
other to IP spoofing attacks. In both sections, the methodologies and algorithms developed
for detection and consequent blocking of the corresponding spoofing attacks will be presented.
Then, the algorithms implemented in practice will also be discussed, with a detailed descrip-
tion of all steps.
5.1 MAC Spoofing Detection
As previously said, Layer 2 devices use MAC addresses as their LAN identifiers. This
address is assigned by the manufacturer to each interface of the device and is controlled by
OUI to be globally unique for all LAN-based devices. But MAC addresses can easily be
changed in most devices without any consequences on their performance. This means that
faking MAC addresses is a simple way for an attacker to perform network security attacks.
There are several reasons to perform this kind of attacks [66], but one of the most common
is to impersonate an already authenticated user. In this case, the attacker just needs to
know the client MAC address and change its own address accordingly. In this way, and since
the user is already authenticated on the network, the attacker can send and receive traffic
disguised by the MAC address of the user. Next, we will present a procedure, based on the
SNMP protocol, to detect these Layer 2 attacks and block the access of the intruder to the
network.
5.1.1 Attack Detection
In Figure 5.1 the method to detect and block MAC spoofing attacks is described. This
mechanism will basically create a record of the MAC addresses of all interfaces of the different
network end devices. If someone tries to fake a MAC address, then the port or even the
switch will change when, compared with this record, because that MAC address will appear
on another location. This algorithm is able to detect such situation and figure out if it is
really a MAC spoofing attack or if the client has simply changed the physical location of the
device.
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Figure 5.1: MAC Spoofing Detection and Blocking
The algorithm starts by performing the network discovery procedure described in the pre-
vious chapter in order to find all network devices and identify them. When dealing with MAC
spoofing attacks, we just have to deal with MAC addresses and, therefore, only Layer 2 devices
(switches, in the case) need to be analyzed. After selecting these devices, each one is analyzed
individually. Then, useful information is retrieved from the MIB of the switches. The data
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for the detection of MAC spoofing attacks should be selected and retrieved using the SNMP
”snmpwalk” command and then put in an array, so it can be easily accessed. The necessary
MIB objects are represented in Table 4.1. The dot1dTpFdbAddress, dot1dTpFdbPort and
atPhysAddress objects were all already mentioned in the previous chapter and they provide
information corresponding to the MAC Address Table of the switch. Below, we will show
why this information is so important and we will mention other MIB objects that are used in
this detection method.
On the switch, only access ports are important because end hosts are connected there.
Since all ports are already known, access ports can be selected using the MIB object vlan-
PortlslOperStatus (also in Table 4.1), which returns the value ’1’ for Trunking or ’2’ for Not
Trunking. However, an access port can also be connected to another network device instead
of an end host. In this case, the MIB object atPhysAddress should be used. If any of the
MAC addresses associated to an access port belongs to the list of MAC addresses of the
atPhysAddress object, it means that the access port is not connected to an end device and it
should be excluded from the ports to analyze. Figure 5.2 represents an example of the access
ports that need to be analyzed (those connected to end devices) and the excluded ports.
Figure 5.2: Access ports selection
The first stage of the procedure is completed and we have now all the necessary information
from the switch, with a list of all MAC addresses of end hosts connected to the switch as
well as the access ports where they are connected to. The next step consists on reading each
MAC address associated to the selected access ports. When a MAC address is analyzed, the
algorithm should check if it was already recorded. It was chosen to maintain a record of all
MAC addresses of the end hosts that are found on the network. If the MAC address that it is
being analyzed does not exist yet in this historic, then a record must be added, containing the
MAC address, the corresponding network device and the port where it is connected to. The
access port is already known and the information about the switch can be retrieved through
the MIB object hostName (OID .1.3.6.1.4.1.9.2.1.3). The registration time is also recorded,
as well as a counter whose value is ’0’. Figure 5.3 represents this procedure. This is all
the information that is needed regarding each MAC address that is detected in the network.
Then, the next MAC address in the array of end hosts’ MAC addresses should be read. When
there are no more MAC addresses to read, the algorithm moves to the next Layer 2 device.
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Figure 5.3: End host registration process
When a MAC address is already registered, its location in the network should be checked
to verify if it is in the same place or if it has moved to another location. The historic already
contains information about the switch and port associated to this MAC address, which allows
identifying the location of the end host. So, the recorded information is compared to the
switch and port that the MAC address is using now: if they are equal, it means that the end
host is in the same place (Fig. 5.4); otherwise, we can be sure that the end host has changed
its physical location (Fig. 5.5) or someone is faking this MAC address and is using it to
connect to the network from another location (Fig. 5.6). When the second case is detected,
we are ahead of a possible MAC spoofing attack. In the next section we will describe the
procedure to evaluate and determine if someone is trying to perform a network attack and, if
it is the case, to block the access of this intruder.
Figure 5.4: No changes on the network
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Figure 5.5: End host changed physical location
Figure 5.6: MAC spoofing attack scenario
5.1.2 Attack Blocking
Once a possible attack is detected, it is important to verify if it is a real attack or if the
user has just moved the end device to another location on the network. The first question
that should be answered in order to understand the reason for this change is: how much time
has passed since the MAC address has been registered? When the MAC address was recorded
for the first time, many parameters were saved and one of them was exactly the registration
time. In this way, it is possible to check how much time has elapsed since that instant. When
there is a MAC spoofing attack, a client is communicating and the attacker is using the same
MAC address to send and receive traffic from the network, but from another location. This
means that in a real MAC spoofing attack changes will be detected in the port (and possibly
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in the switch) associated to the MAC address in a short period (of a few seconds). So, if
the time elapsed since the MAC address has been registered is greater than this short time
interval, it means that probably the client has just changed his host location and the network
is not under attack. In this case, the new port has to be recorded and, if it is the case, the
new switch. The registration time is also updated and the counter is set to value ’0’ (if it was
not ’0’ already). Figure 5.7 shows this situation.
Figure 5.7: End host information updated
On the other hand, if the time since the MAC address registration is shorter than the time
period that is considered normal when the network is under attack, then another question
arises: how many times this MAC address has changed its location during the short time
period we are considering? The counter parameter can be used to answer this question. If
a change was detected in the last seconds, then the counter associated to the MAC address
must be checked. If the counter has the value ’0’ or ’1’, then it means that in the last seconds
that MAC address has not changed its location or has changed it only once, which can be
considered normal. In this case, the counter is incremented and the new port is updated. The
time parameter is not updated because it is necessary to check if there will be more changes
in the next few seconds (Fig. 5.8). If the counter reaches a value greater than ’1’, it means
that a change of location was detected more than once in a short period of a few seconds,
which can be considered as an unusual behavior and consequently there is a high probability
that the network is under a MAC spoofing attack (Fig. 5.9).
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Figure 5.8: MAC address detected on different location - Counter incremented
Figure 5.9: Counter reaches value ’2’ - MAC spoofing attack detected
When a MAC spoofing attack is detected, it must be blocked. Using this method, this
operation is really easy to accomplish because a record of the previous ports and switches is
maintained and compared to the port and switch that a given MAC address is using now to
access the network. So, if a MAC spoofing attack is detected and the attacker is using a switch
to perform the attack, the port where the MAC address is connected right before the counter
reaches the value ’2’ will be blocked. Using the information corresponding to the bridge ports
associated to the different MAC address (available from the dot1dTpFdbPort MIB object),
the interface index of the device that has to be blocked can be retrieved using the SNMP
command ”snmpget” over the dot1dBasePortIfIndex MIB object (OID .1.3.6.1.2.1.17.1.4.1.2).
Finally, it is possible to block the port using the SNMP command ”snmpset” over the MIB
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object ifAdminStatus (OID .1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.7), which will shut down the interface and block
the attack. The legitimate user continues accessing the network without any problems (Fig.
5.10). In case the attacker is accessing the network from an unmanaged device, the device
must be checked manually, as previously said.
Figure 5.10: MAC spoofing attack blocked
5.1.3 Algorithm Implementation
In the previous sections of this chapter we have presented the general algorithm for de-
tection and posterior blocking of MAC spoofing attacks. This method can be developed in
practice on different ways according to the system where it will be deployed. Thus, this sec-
tion describes one practical implementation of the previous algorithm for the purpose of this
project and for the creation of testing scenarios that will be used later.
For the implementation of this algorithm, a single script using Bash language was devel-
oped, like we have done for the network discovery algorithm. The reasons for the use of this
scripting language are the same that were presented before. In terms of the contents of this
script, it starts by requesting the the SNMP version from the user. Obviously, this version
must be the same as the one configured on the network equipment. Depending on the SNMP
version, the user should insert the community string or the username and password. Also
possible temporary files containing old information from previous executions of the script are
deleted. Then, information with all Layer 2 devices, in particular switches, obtained from the
execution of the network discovery algorithm is read and the script is ready for detection of
MAC spoofing attacks by executing function Detect Spoofing in an infinite cycle.
For the detection of the attacks, the function accesses sequentially each switch by using
their managing IP addresses. These IP addresses are used mainly to retrieve information
from the switch MIB. For each switch, a function Switch is executed and ”snmpwalk” com-
mands are sent to retrieve information from the dot1dTpFdbAddress, dot1dTpFdbPort and
atPhysAddress MIB objects (Table 4.1) and put it in arrays. These objects provide informa-
43
tion about the MAC addresses of the forwarding table of the switch and the corresponding
bridge ports, as well as the MAC addresses from all network equipment on the network.
For the detection of MAC spoofing attacks through this method, a record of all end hosts
connected to each switch will be created. So, since the MAC addresses of all devices in the
network are already known, it’s necessary to select only end devices. For each bridge port,
it is used the vlanPortlslOperStatus MIB object to select the access ports. Then, for each
access port, it is verified if the MAC addresses associated to that port belong to the list of
MAC addresses retrieved from the atPhysAddress MIB object. It is known that end hosts are
not present on this list (only network devices are) and so, only MAC addresses that are not
contained on this list are selected. After executing this task, all end devices connected to the
switch and the bridge port where they are connected to are known.
The next task is to execute a cycle to analyze each of the selected MAC addresses. For
each one, it is checked if it was already registered. To keep a record of all MAC addresses
and other useful information about an end device, some auxiliary text files are used. So, the
auxiliary file containing the MAC addresses is read to verify the presence or not of each MAC
address. In case of a new one, the MAC address is added to the file and information about
the port and switch where it is connected to, registration time and counter must be recorded.
The port is read from the array with the selected ports and written into the corresponding
text file. For the identification of the switch, its hostname is used, which is retrieved from
the hostName MIB object and written into the devices text file. For the registration time,
the command ”date” is executed with the following parameters to consult the present time:
-H for hours, -M for minutes and S for seconds. Then, hours and minutes are converted
into seconds and the registration time is written into the correspondent text file as the total
number of seconds. It was decided to record also the present date, so the script can be more
accurate in cases that a change is detected after a few seconds since the device registration but
on different days. It’s a rare situation but it has to be considered. The date is obtained from
the ”date” command too, with parameters m, d and Y for month, day and year, respectively.
This information is written in a specific text file. Finally, for the counter it is simply written
the value ’0’ into a counters’ text file.
On other hand, if a MAC address is already present in the MAC addresses text file, it
must be checked where it was connected when it was recorded. This is done by reading the
corresponding port from the text file containing this information. An auxiliary variable was
used to know from which line the MAC address was read, so the port information should be
in the same line. When the line with the port associated to the MAC address is read, it is
compared to the present port contained on the array of selected ports. If they’re different,
there was definitely a change on the origin of the MAC address and function Possible Spoofing
is executed. Otherwise, the same line is read from the file containing the hostname of the
switches to check the device where that end host is connected to. Even unlikely, there could
be the case in which the port associated to an end device is the same as the recorded one
but from different switches. If the hostnames doesn’t match, the Possible Spoofing function
is also executed.
As it was explained on the previous sections, when a change on the origin of a MAC
address is detected, it must be checked the time elapsed since the registration of that end
host. Starting from a more general perspective, the line from the dates text file corresponding
to the registration ”date” of that MAC address is read. Using the date command with the
previous parameters, the present date is compared with the recorded date. If they’re different,
it is automatically assumed that the change happened on different days and there was simply
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a change on the device location, even though the attack could be performed on a day change
(23:59 to 00:00), which is very unlikely. So, in this case, the new device information is
registered. The exact line from the files that must be replaced with new information is known,
and the ”sed” command allows performing this task. To facilitate the task all information
is updated, even if certain parameters haven’t changed. So, the port and switch where the
device is connected now is written in the corresponding text files by replacing the previous
information. Also the new date and time is read and written into their files as well as the
counter with the value ’0’.
In the situation that dates are equal, the line with information about the registration
time of that device is read. Then, the present time is read by executing the ”date” command
and converted into seconds. The time of registration is subtracted to the present time and
the difference between both corresponds to the time elapsed. As previously mentioned, in
this method, MAC spoofing attacks are detected based on consecutive changes on the origin
of a certain MAC address during a short time period. Thus, for the implementation of the
algorithm, this time period was defined as 30 seconds. So, if the difference between registration
time and present time is greater than 30 seconds or a MAC spoofing attack has just been
blocked, new device information should be recorded in substitution of the old one. In the first
case it is assumed that the end host changed to a different location on the network and the
second case is due to the fact that when an attack is blocked, information about the intruder’s
device is contained on the auxiliary text files and this information needs to be replaced for the
authentic and legitimate client information. This is done exactly as previously by executing
”sed” commands. In the second case, it is also necessary to set the variable signalizing that
the attack has been blocked with value ’0’. On other hand, if the time passed is shorter
than the defined 30 seconds and any attack wasn’t blocked recently, the counter parameter
associated to that MAC address must be checked. Again, the counters text file is read line by
line until the line corresponding to the device information is reached. If the counter value is
’0’ or ’1’, the counter is incremented by executing the ”sed” command to substitute it for the
new value in the file and information about the switch and port where the host is connected
is updated. Finally, the MAC spoofing attack is detected if counter value that was read from
the value is greater than ’1’. In this case, a Block Spoofing function is executed.
To block the spoofing attack, the interface where the MAC address is currently connected
will be simply turned down. The bridge port associated to the MAC address is known and
the ”snmpget” command is executed to retrieve the information about the corresponding port
index. To turn the interface down, the ”snmpset” command is executed. The counter value
is set with value ’0’ using the ”sed” command and the variable signalizing that an attack has
just been block is set with value ’1’.
We described the whole script developed to implement the algorithm described in the
previous sections of this chapter. In a later chapter, some tests will be performed using this
script. Next section will present the developed methodology for the detection of other type
of network attacks: IP spoofing attacks.
5.2 IP Spoofing Detection
After the analysis of Layer 2 network attacks, it is time to take a look at Layer 3 attacks
or IP spoofing attacks. Unlike MAC addresses, IP addresses must be configured whenever
new equipment is connected to the network; otherwise, communication will fail. But, when
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IP addresses are not assigned automatically through DHCP and the user doesn’t know all IP
addresses of the network, there is always the risk to configure a device with an IP address
that is already in use. IP spoofing attacks are based on the principle that if the intruder
impersonates an authorized client by using its IP address, then he can get access to the
network because all devices will believe that those packets come from a trusted host [67].
There are several tools to prevent this kind of network attacks. Here, it will be presented
a simple methodology based on the SNMP protocol. Like it was done in the previous chapter,
the algorithm description will be divided into two parts: detect the IP spoofing attack and
block it. Then, a section dedicated to the implementation of this algorithm will be presented.
5.2.1 Attack Detection
Figure 5.11 shows a method to detect IP spoofing attacks. For each detected end host
a record is created containing its IP and MAC addresses. If an attacker tries to use an IP
address that is already in use, that occurrence will be detected by the simple reason that the
MAC address of his device is different from the MAC address of the victim. This is the basic
principle of this method.
As shown in Fig. 5.11, the first thing to do is a network discovery to find all routers,
switches and APs on the network. Since this method is about Layer 3 attacks, all routers
must be analyzed until an IP spoofing attack is detected. When that happens, the attacker
access to the network must be blocked. To do so, all Layer 2 devices have to be checked until
the intruder is found.
First of all, after having a complete list of all Layer 2 and Layer 3 devices, each router of
the network is analyzed separately. Then, it is necessary to retrieve and select information
from its MIB in order to perform the attack detection. The MIB objects that we need to
retrieve from routers and put in an array are: ipNetToMediaNetAddress, ipNetToMediaType
and atPhysAddress. The correspondent OIDs can be consulted in Table 2.3.
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Figure 5.11: IP Spoofing Detection
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With this information, it is possible to have access to all IP addresses of the router’s
forwarding table, as well as the corresponding MAC addresses and address types. A new
cycle must be performed in order to analyze all these IP addresses, until there are no more
addresses to read, and then move to another router and perform the same steps. When an IP
address is analyzed, the first thing to do is to check for the address type. An IP address can be
selected to be static or dynamic, but in this case we are only interested on dynamic addresses
because we are looking for IP addresses of end devices and these are always dynamic. If
an IP address is static, then the next IP address from the array must be read. If that IP
address is dynamic, we have to check if it was already recorded. Like we did for MAC spoofing
attacks, a record including some parameters is kept in order to have a comparison base for
the future. For each end host IP address, the corresponding MAC address and registration
time are saved. Figure 5.12 represents the registration process.
Figure 5.12: End host registration process
If a given IP address was already registered, then the recorded information must be
checked. First, the IP address that was recorded should be read and compared to the MAC
address of the device that it is using the same IP address at this moment. If they are equal,
then it means that the IP address is being used by the same equipment and nothing wrong
is happening, so the next IP address from the array can be read (Fig. 5.13). If the MAC
address is different, then two things could have happened: the user simply started using a
new device and configured it with the same IP address in order to have access to the network
(Fig. 5.14) or someone is trying to perform a network attack using the IP address of an
authorized client (Fig. 5.15).
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Figure 5.13: Same end hosts associated to IP addresses
Figure 5.14: End host configured with an already assigned IP address
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Figure 5.15: IP spoofing attack scenario
In order to distinguish between these two situations, the registration time parameter is
used. It is not common that an IP address is associated to different end devices in a short
period of time. It can happen occasionally, for example when an end host leaves the network
and the IP address that was associated to it is available to be assigned to another device. It is
expected that once an end host is configured with an IP address, no one else will get the same
IP address for a period of time of at least some minutes. Based on this principle, if different
MAC addresses are detected for the same IP address, it must be verified how many time has
passed since it was registered. If this time is greater than the time period that is considered
as normal, then the situation from Figure 5.14 is considered and a new record for this new
MAC address must be created, besides updating the new registration time (Fig. 5.16).
Figure 5.16: New end host information updated
On the other hand, if only a short period of time has elapsed since it was registered, then
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there is a great probability that someone is using the IP address of someone else to perform
an IP spoofing attack against the network. This is the case of Figure 5.15 and we have to
move on to the next stage in order to find the location on the network of this new MAC
address and block the port of the switch or AP where it is connected to.
5.2.2 Attack Blocking
At this point, the IP spoofing attack was detected and the MAC address of the device
that it is being used to perform the attack is already known. So, each Layer 2 device on the
network should be analyzed in order to localize this MAC address. Figure 5.17 describes the
method that was devised to block IP spoofing attacks.
The first thing to do is to retrieve the necessary information from the MIB of each Layer
2 device, as was previously done every time we needed to analyze any network device. In this
case, the MIB information that it will be used is the same that it was mentioned before to
detect MAC spoofing attacks and it is present in Table 4.1. So, the MIB objects retrieved
from switchs are: dot1dTpFdbAddress, dot1dTpFdbPort and atPhysAddress.
In the case of switches, ports that are being used exclusively by end devices should be
identified (Fig. 5.2). In order to do that, the switch access ports are selected using the
MIB object vlanPortlslOperStatus (OID .1.3.6.1.4.1.9.5.1.9.3.1.8). Then, the ports that are
connected to other network devices must be excluded. If the MAC address associated to any
of these ports is present in the list of MAC addresses retrieved from the atPhysAddress MIB
object, it means that this port is not connected to an end host and it can be excluded. After
performing these steps, we have only the necessary switch ports.
The next step is to analyze each one of the selected ports until there are no more ports to
read and, then, move to the next Layer 2 device. For each port, the associated MAC address in
this particular moment is read. Then, this MAC address is compared with the MAC address
that was identified as belonging to the intruder. If they are different, it means that the end
device that is connected to the port is not the one that we are looking for and we can move to
the next port. When the right MAC address is finally found, the associated port is blocked
(Fig. 5.18). The interface index is necessary to block the port. Using the bridge port retrieved
from the dot1dTpFdbPort MIB object, it is possible to get the corresponding interface index
using the dot1dBasePortIfIndex MIB object and executing a ”snmpget” command of the
SNMP protocol. To turn the interface down, the ”snmpset” command is executed over the
ifAdminStatus MIB object (OID .1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.7).
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Figure 5.17: IP Spoofing Blocking
In case the attacker is accessing the network from an AP, all MAC addresses connected to
the wireless interface will be read. If the MAC address of the intruder is not present on this
list of MAC addresses, it means that it is not connected to the access point and we can move
to the next Layer 2 device. Otherwise, if the MAC address we are looking for is detected in a
certain AP, it must be added to the MAC ACL of the access point via SSH in order to block
the access of the host to the network.
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Figure 5.18: IP spoofing attack blocked
This methodology is an efficient way to block IP spoofing attacks from intruders that are
accessing the network using switches or access points.
5.2.3 Algorithm Implementation
Finally, a practical implementation of the previous algorithm will be described. Like in
the case of MAC spoofing attack detection, a single script using Bash scripting language was
developed. In the previous sections it was explained that this method can be applied either if
the attacker is accessing the network from a switch or from an access point and the steps for
the implementation of the algorithm in both cases was described. However, for the purpose
of this project, a script for detection of IP spoofing attacks on networks in which switches are
the only Layer 2 devices was developed. Thus, if there is any AP present in the network, it
will be defined as an unmanaged device.
In terms of the actual content of the script, it starts by requesting the SNMP version
to the user as well as the community string or the username and authentication password,
depending on the version in use. Then, information from previous executions of the script
is deleted and managing IP addresses from all routers and switches present in the network
are read from auxiliary text files and put in separate arrays. To start the detection process,
function Detect IPSpoofing is executed in an infinite loop.
This function will analyze sequentially each router contained on the routers’ array, using
a while loop. For each router, it starts by retrieving the device hostname from the hostName
MIB object using a ”snmpwalk” command combined with a ”cut” command. Then, a Router
function is executed to retrieve other necessary information from the MIB of the router. As it
was said, this information is obtained from the ipNetToMediaNetAddress, ipNetToMediaType
and atPhysAddress MIB objects using also the two previous commands and put in separate
arrays. Now, each IP address from the corresponding array should be analyzed. To select
only dynamic IP addresses from end hosts, an ”if” statement is used to check the address
type associated to the IP address.
As previously said, a record of all end hosts’ IP addresses is kept. This information is
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maintained in an auxiliary text file. After selecting a dynamic IP address corresponding to
an end device, it is necessary to check if that IP address was already written into the file or
not. This is done by reading each line of the file and comparing with the IP address. In case
the IP address is not present in the register, it is added to the file. Also the MAC address
associated to the IP address is written into a specific text file containing all MAC addresses
from end hosts. The other parameter that must be saved is the registration time. Like it was
done for the case of MAC spoofing attack detection, a ”date” command is executed to obtain
information about hours, minutes and seconds. Then, hours and minutes are converted into
seconds and registration time is written into another text file as the total number of seconds.
For the same reason mentioned in the previous chapter, it was also created a record for the
registration date.
For cases in which an IP address of an end device was already recorded, the corresponding
line number in the file is verified. Then, the same line is read from the file containing all
MAC addresses. This allows consulting the MAC address associated to the IP address. If the
present MAC address is the same as the recorded one, it means that the device possessing
that IP address is still the same and the next IP address from the array is read. Otherwise,
if the MAC addresses are different, it must be verified in first place if an IP spoofing attack
has just been blocked. When a network attack of this type is blocked, the last information
contained in the register is from the intruder’s host, which means that it must be updated.
The MAC address from the authorized client replaces the previous one in the file using the
command ”sed”. Also the registration time and date is updated using the ”date” command to
obtain the information and the ”sed” command to replace the old one. Besides, the variable
signalizing the attack blocking is set to ’0’.
When MAC addresses are different but any IP spoofing attack wasn’t recently blocked,
it is necessary to check how much times has passed since the MAC address was updated for
the last time. First, the registration date is read from the corresponding file and from the
line associated to the IP address. Then, it is compared to the present date. Again, as it was
explained in the implementation of the MAC spoofing attack detection, there could be the
possibility that an attack is performed on a day change, but since the two dates are different
it is assumed that the change on the device associated to the IP address happened after a
time period considered normal. Thus, if this happens, the ”sed” command is executed to
update the information in the files with the new device MAC address, date and time. On
other hand, if the dates are different, it is necessary to compare the time elapsed since the
information associated to the IP address was updated for the last time. So, the text file
containing the registration times is analyzed. When the correct time is read, it is subtracted
to the present time, which is obtained executing the ”date” command and converted into
seconds. The difference between both corresponds to the seconds that has passed.
As previously explained, once an IP address is configured on a machine, it is very likely
that this IP address won’t belong to any other device at least for a time period of large minutes.
For the implementation of this algorithm, this time period was defined as 30 minutes, which
corresponds to 1800 seconds. Thus, when the difference between the present time and the
registration time is greater than this time period, it is considered that a new device was
configured with the IP address and no network attack is present. In this situation, the
MAC address from the new end device should replace the old one and the registration time
is updated (since the date hasn’t changed, it doesn’t need to be updated). Again, ”sed”
command is used to perform this task. If the time passed is shorter than the defined 30
seconds, it is immediately assumed that the network is under an IP spoofing attack. The
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MAC address of the intruder is the one that it is associated to the IP address at the present
moment and a Block Spoofing function is executed by the script to find this device in the
network and block the attack.
To find the attacker’s host, each switch is sequentially analyzed by reading their IP ad-
dresses from the array. Then, function Switch is executed to retrieve information from the
switch MIB. The MIB objects dot1dTpFdbAddress, dot1dTpFdbPort and atPhysAddress are
retrieved using the ”snmpwalk” command combined with ”cut” command and put in separate
arrays, as usual. Then, it is executed a process over the array of bridge ports of the switch
that it is similar to the one described in the implementation of the MAC spoofing detection
algorithm. This process won’t be described again, but it will basically select the access ports
associated to end devices because these are the only ports where the intruder’s host could
be connected to. After the ports have been selected, it is performed a while cycle to an-
alyze each one of them. For each selected port, the MAC address of the device connected
there is read from the array. The MAC addresses are compared to the one that must be
blocked until they match. When the intruder’s MAC address is found, it is retrieved from the
dot1dBasePortIfIndex MIB object the interface index associated to the bridge port using the
”snmpget” command. It is also possible to retrieve the interface name using the ifDescr MIB
object. Finally, to block the attack a ”snmpset” command is executed over the ifAdminSta-
tus MIB object to turn the interface down. To finish the process, a variable signalizing the
attack block is set with value ’1’ so the information about the authorized client’s host can be
registered again.
In this section, we described an implementation of the metodologies for the detection and
blocking of IP spoofing attacks, which were previously presented. In the following chapter, we
will perform some tests in which this script as well as the previous ones will be executed over
certain network scenarios in order to verify their efficiency and evaluate their performance.
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Chapter 6
Network Equipment and Software
The previous chapters presented three different methodologies for network monitoring.
The first one was directed for the discovery of all equipment present in the network and the
other two were related to security issues, specifically to the detection of network attacks, in
particular MAC spoofing and IP spoofing attacks. After the description of these algorithms,
one possible implementation for each one of these methodologies was also presented. Now, it
is necessary to validate the efficiency of the developed scripts and, in general, of all algorithms.
In order to test the previous methodologies, some network scenarios were created. Then,
the developed scripts should be executed over these networks in order to obtain results. To
facilitate the deployment of the networks, a network simulator software was used, where
virtual equipment was connected. This allows to easily create networks with much more
flexibility than using real equipment. However, it was also necessary to use some real devices
to perform certain tasks, which were connected to the simulated equipment. This means that
the created scenarios combine real devices and virtual equipment to form networks in which
the previous methodologies should be deployed and tested.
This chapter starts by presenting the chosen network simulation software used on the
deployment of networks for test purposes and then, all used equipment will be presented.
For both virtual and real devices, we will present a description and show how the network
equipment is configured. In particular, in case of real devices, it is also explained how they
were connected to the simulated network.
6.1 Network Simulation Software
As it was mentioned, using exclusively real equipment for the creation of testing networks
is not reasonable. The deployment of real networks is not practical and most of all, it can be
really expensive depending on the size of the network and the number of computers, routers,
switches or other network devices to be used. Nowadays, several softwares that are able
to perform network simulation have been developed and many of them can recreate exactly
any detail of a real network. This permits to easily deploy a network with the benefit of
saving space, money and time. Other point to have in consideration is that SNMP retrieves
information from the MIB of each network device but depending on the device manufacturer,
the MIB objects can be organized in different ways. Since the implementation of the previous
methodologies were developed for Cisco network devices, which are probably the most used, it
makes sense to look for some network simulation programs that emulate real Cisco hardware
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and software and check which one would better fit the purpose of this project. So, three
different programs were taken into consideration for the choice of the network simulator
software: Cisco Packet Tracer, NetSim and GNS3.
6.1.1 Cisco Packet Tracer
Cisco Packet Tracer is a network simulation software developed by Cisco for educational
purposes, in order to support its Networking Academy program. This software provides
visual simulation of networks and allows the creation of networks with an almost unlimited
number of devices. The configuration of the network devices is done through a command-
line interface just like in real equipment. It also provides tables, diagrams and other visual
representation and offers a multiuser functionality that permits multiple users to work on the
same project through the Internet [68]. This software has two operation modes available to
analyze the network behavior. The first is the real-time mode that shows how real devices
would behave and the immediate network response to any network change; the other is the
simulation mode and it is directed to background concepts and allows to control time intervals,
data transfer rates, bandwidth and manipulate the propagation of data packets through
the network. This software supports most of network protocols, including SNMP, which is
the basis of the developed algorithms. Some other characteristics of this software are the
possibility of inserting interface cards into modular routers and switches, creating virtual
networks over real ones and its compatibility with Windows and Linux (Ubuntu and Fedora)
operating systems. On a first view, this network simulator program have all the characteristics
needed for the purpose of this project, but the fact that it is only available for instructors,
students and alumni registered on the Cisco Networking Academy makes the choice of this
software not possible [69].
6.1.2 Boson NetSim - Network Simulator
Other network simulator software is NetSim, which is a Cisco network simulator developed
by Boson. Boson is a company that provides material to prepare students for IT certification
exams from Cisco, Microsoft CompTIA and others. NetSim is one of the tools developed to
prepare users for Cisco certification exams [70]. It uses Network Simulator, Router Simulator
and EROUTER software technologies to simulate a real network and it is available on three
different versions, each one with specific characteristics and directed for a different Cisco certi-
fication. Focusing on its features, NetSim supports up to 42 routers and 6 switches on a total
of 200 devices on the network, it simulates network traffic with virtual packet technology and
it provides Telnet mode or Console mode to interact with the network devices [70]. Although
it supports Telnet, SNMP was the chosen remote monitoring protocol and unfortunately this
software doesn’t support it. Furthermore, this software is not a free application and that is
one of the priorities on the software’s choice.
6.1.3 GNS3: Graphical Network Simulator
Finally, the last software is called GNS3. GNS3 is a graphical network simulator that
emulates complex networks and is used mainly by network engineers, administrators and
students to prepare themselves for Cisco and Juniper certification exams. This network
software takes advantage from other programs to turn simulations more similar to real labs.
The first program is Dynamips, which is the core program that allows running and emulating
58
a Cisco IOS in a virtual environment. GNS3 works as the GUI part that runs over Dynamips
to provide a graphical interface. This way, a user can easily create different network topologies
using a diversity of Cisco routers. While Dynamips is responsible for the back-end operation
of emulating routers with real IOS images, GNS3 uses Dynagen as the text-based front-end to
establish communication with Dynamips [71]. GNS3 also supports other machine emulators
and virtualizers like Qemu, Virtualbox or Pemu. This allows a user to simulate networks
with a wide diversity of devices like Cisco ASA and PIX firewalls, Cisco IPS, Juniper routers
or hosts (Linux, Windows, MacOS X, etc.). Other advantages of GNS3 are the possibility
of connecting the virtual network to the real world with real devices and performing packet
capture using Wireshark. Switching is also possible to emulate by using an EtherSwitch card
in a router. Finally, in terms of features, GNS3 is an open source software that may be used
in operating systems like Windows, Linux and MacOS X. Some limitations of GNS3 are its
limited throughput, which is 1000 packets per second in the virtual environment (in a real
router it would provide a much greater throughput) and the large amount of real and virtual
memory that it can consume and CPU usage [72]. About this last point, GNS3 is already
prepared with some tools in order to prevent this memory and CPU usage issues but it must
be always taken into account that the higher the number of routers and network devices, the
higher will be the consume [73].
After analyzing the characteristics of all this software, GNS3 was selected as the network
emulator software tha best fits the purpose of this dissertation. It’s a really complete tool
where actual Cisco IOS are being emulated with all characteristics of real Cisco devices. The
fact that Cisco IOS supports SNMP protocol and the possibility to combine virtual devices to
real equipment turns GNS3 into the perfect tool to create testing scenarios for the previous
methodologies.
6.2 Virtual Equipment
Now that the network simulation software was chosen, it will be presented the devices
to be simulated in this program. GNS3/Dynamips is a powerful tool, capable to simulate
Cisco routers by running real Cisco IOS. So, instead of using real routers with all already
mentioned disadvantages, virtual Cisco routers are used, which GNS3 emulates with the same
exact behavior of real ones.
First, it is necessary to get the desired Cisco IOS image and add it to the list of IOS images
in GNS3 to be able to deploy it in any network. For the purpose of this project, we used
Cisco routers using an IOS image from a Cisco C3640 router. Each of these routers consumes
128Mb of RAM and it can support one FastEthernet interface, up to five Ethernet interfaces
and an EtherSwitch card with up to sixteen ports. When running a router for the first time,
it is necessary to define an Idle PC value. This is a functionality provided by GNS3 to reduce
the CPU usage, allowing the addiction of more network devices. The configuration of the
routers is done through a command-line interface. Following, Cisco commands representing
the configurations made on each router to assure that they would be correctly deployed on
the network are shown, assuring that the developed scripts would be successfully tested.
First, it is necessary to assign the router with a hostname. The hostname will allow to
identify each network device and it is essential for the correct execution of the developed
algorithms:
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Router>enable
Router# config t
Router(config)# hostname [Router Hostname]
Then, it is necessary to configure each used interface with an IP address and also enable it,
in order to connect the router with other devices. Normally, if a router interface is connected
to other Layer 3 devices or to a Layer 2 device in a network configured with a single VLAN,
the interfaces configuration is as follow:
Hostname(config)# interface [Interface Name]
Hostname(config-if)# ip address [IP Address] [Network Mask]
Hostname(config-if)# no shutdown
For networks with more than one VLAN, it is needed a router to route the traffic and allow
network devices in different VLANs to communicate with each other [74]. So, in the router
interface directly connected to this network, we should create sub interfaces associated to each
VLAN. This method is called Router-on-a-stick and allows different VLANs to communicate
via the sub interfaces of the router. In this situation, the creation of sub interfaces over an
interface is as follows:
Hostname(config)# interface [Interface Name]
Hostname(config-if)# no shutdown
Hostname(config-if)# interface [Interface Name].[Sub Interface Number]
Hostname(config-if)# encapsulation dot1Q [Vlan Number]
Hostname(config-if)# ip address [IP Address] [Network Mask]
To correctly route packets over the whole network it is necessary to enable a routing
protocol. The RIP protocol was the chosen one for test purposes. It is a distance-vector
routing protocol in which an algorithm is used to calculate paths based on the information
sent periodically from neighbor routers [75].
Hostname(config)# router rip
Hostname(config-router)# network [Directly Connected Network]
The last command must be executed for each network that is directly connected to the
router. Obviously, it is also necessary to configure the router as an SNMP server so the
local machine can send SNMP commands to retrieve information from its MIB. The following
commands enable SNMP version 2 and version 3, depending on the desired one:
• SNMP Version 2:
Hostname(config)# snmp-server community [Community String] RW
• SNMP Version 3:
Hostname(config)# snmp-server group [Groupname] v3 auth
Hostname(config)# snmp-server user [Username] [Groupname] v3 auth md5 [Password]
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Finally, to avoid the configuration of each router every time a network simulation starts,
it is possible to copy the current configuration to a TFTP server that should be configured on
the local computer. Of course, this is only possible after the communication between router
and local host is working properly. Then, this configuration file should be set as the startup
configuration when simulation starts. This is defined in GNS3 for each router so every time
it is initialized, it will upload the file and the router will be immediately connected and ready
to use. The copy command that should be executed after the previous configurations have
been conducted is:
Hostname# copy running-config tftp
The previous commands provide routers with the basic configuration, necessary for testing
purposes. Of course, other router parameters can be defined and configured according to the
network characteristics.
Routers using an EtherSwitch card to work exclusively as a switch have been defined as
unmanaged devices for the network discovery algorithm presented earlier. However, these
devices can still exist on the network and they should actually be deployed for test purposes
to observe if the developed script can actually ignore them. The configuration of routers using
switching modules should be the same as any normal switch and it will be described in the
next section when the configuration of real switches is discussed.
To simulate real network scenarios, it is also necessary to have many end hosts communi-
cating over the network. As previously referred, GNS3 provides the possibility of emulating
other devices using virtualizers such as VirtualBox. After VirtualBox has been correctly con-
figured on GNS3, it is necessary to choose an operating system for the emulation of virtual
hosts. For experimental tests, only simple operations need to be executed from these hosts,
so Linux Microcore 4.0.2 was chosen as the operating system to run on end devices. Since
there’s no need for many features, Linux Microcore is a minimal operating system with only
8Mb size and a command-line interface that provides some basic Linux commands. To con-
nect each virtual host to the rest of the network it should be configured with the following
commands:
$ sudo ifconfig eth1 [Host IP Address] netmask [Network Mask] up
$ sudo route add default gw [Default Gateway] eth1
The first command will assign the interface Ethernet1 of the virtual host with an IP ad-
dress. Ethernet1 is the default interface to establish the communication between the emulated
host and GNS3. The second command will define the default gateway associated to this host.
If all parameters are correctly introduced, the virtual machine is now able to communicate
with the network. As in case of routers, this was the configuration made for test purposes.
In terms of virtual equipment, Dynamips and VirtualBox emulate, respectively, routers
and end hosts on the local machine and they can be easily deployed on any virtual network
created on GNS3 by simply adding the correspondent device symbol to the workspace. The
described device configurations allowed the simulation of networks and a posterior execution
of the developed scripts. In the next section, we will present the physical equipment used on
the implementation of networks.
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6.3 Real Equipment
We have just mentioned the advantages of using virtual devices. The main reasons are its
flexibility and the possibility of easily creating networks containing more devices. However,
some of the devices used for network simulations on this project were real instead of emulated
by some application. The first one is the local computer that works as the monitoring station.
It would be expected that this computer was real and not emulated as any of the other end
devices for the simple reason that all operations are executed from this machine, including
the emulation of all the previous virtual devices and the execution of the developed scripts
in which SNMP packets are exchanged between this computer (the manager) and all other
network devices (the agents). As mentioned in a previous chapter, the operating system used
on the local computer is Ubuntu. To integrate this machine in the network in order to be able
to communicate with all other network devices, it is necessary to configure it. The following
network configuration was deployed in practice and it represents the basic configuration that
allows the connection of the computer to the network. Of course, other parameters can be
configured according to the network where the host will be connected to.
$ sudo modprobe tun
$ sudo tunctl
$ sudo ifconfig tap0 [IP Address] netmask [Network Mask] up
$ sudo route add net [Network Address] netmask [Network Mask] gw [Default Gateway]
dev tap0
To establish the communication between the local computer and the virtual network
running on GNS3, it is necessary to use a loopback interface. Obviously, this is not a real
interface but a virtual network interface that allows the communication between network
applications running on the same machine [76]. In Ubuntu, the loopback interface is called
a tap interface. The first two commands initialize this interface, so it can be used normally
as any other physical interface. In particular, the first command uploads the tun module,
necessary for the use of the tap interface which is created by the second command. If this
second command is executed more than once, more tap interfaces will be created and made
available for use. Then, the next command assigns the created loopback interface with an IP
address and turns the interface on. Finally, the last command is necessary to define a default
gateway for each network and it should be executed for all virtual networks. This way, each
packet sent from the tap interface to any network will be directed to the corresponding router.
In this case, we didn’t executed a simple command to define a unique default gateway, like
it was done for virtual hosts, because the local computer could have other physical interfaces
connected, for example, to the Internet and the packets sent from these interfaces would also
be directed to this router which wouldn’t know where to route them. After the computer
have been configured, it is necessary to add it to the virtual network in GNS3. When using
real devices, a cloud symbol is used on GNS3 workspace to establish the connection. Then,
on the cloud configurations, the NIO TAP tab is selected, in which the interface used by the
local machine (tap0, in the case) is introduced. The monitoring station is now ready to be
connected to the virtual network created on GNS3.
Another physical device used on the development of network scenarios was a Switch.
GNS3 is a very complete software with most of the necessary features for a network simula-
tion, but unfortunately Dynamips is not able to emulate Cisco switches (or from any other
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manufacturer) like it does for routers. Actually, it provides some alternative solutions, like
using simple Ethernet Switch devices or introducing EtherSwitch cards into routers and using
it only for switching tasks [77]. The first solution is not viable because it provides such a
simple simulation of a switch that it isn’t even possible to configure it or interact with it. It
only allows defining the port type (access or trunk) and VLANs. The other possibility come
with an already mentioned problem. Routers using EtherSwitch cards can perform most of
the tasks that a normal switch does and for the purpose of this project it would work perfectly,
but its MIB contain a lack of information essential for the correct application of the developed
algorithms. Without the missing MIB objects, it is not possible to test the scripts and that
was the reason why this couldn’t be considered an option for switching tasks. So, the best
solution is to use a real switch with all its Layer 2 functionalities and a complete MIB with
all the necessary MIB objects. The real switch used in practice for the creation of networks
was a Cisco Catalyst C3750. As any other network device, it should be correctly configured
so it can be connected to the network and provide all switching features. Following, we will
describe the configuration implemented in practice.
First, it is necessary to define a device hostname so it can be identified and distinguished
from other equipment:
Switch>enable
Switch# config t
Switch(config)# hostname [Switch Hostname]
Then, if there is more than a single VLAN on the network, each of them should be defined
as follows:
Hostname# vlan database
Hostname(vlan)# vlan [Vlan Number]
Now, the essential part of the configuration process is to define the switch ports. Each
interface used should be configured as an access port or trunk port to be connected, respec-
tively, to end devices and other network devices or exclusively to other network devices like
routers and switches.
To define a switch interface as an access port, we should execute the commands:
Hostname(config)# interface [Interface Name]
Hostname(config-if)# switchport mode access
Hostname(config-if)# switchport access vlan [Vlan Number]
Hostname(config-if)# no shutdown
On the other hand, to define an interface as a trunk port, the commands are:
Hostname(config)# interface [Interface Name]
Hostname(config-if)# switchport mode trunk
Hostname(config-if)# switchport trunk encapsulation dot1q
Hostname(config-if)# no shutdown
Since SNMP is used to retrieve information from the network devices, it is necessary that
each one is assigned with an IP address, so the local host can access its MIB. Thus, an IP
address must be configured on the switch only for managing purposes:
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Hostname(config)# interface Vlan [Vlan Number]
Hostname(config-if)# ip address [IP Address] [Network Mask]
Finally, the switch should be defined as an SNMP server to allow the exchange of SNMP
packets between the device and the manager (the local computer). As in case of routers, the
commands for the configuration of an SNMP server using version 2 and version 3 are:
• SNMP Version 2:
Hostname(config)#snmp-server community [Community String] RW
• SNMP Version 3:
Hostname(config)#snmp-server group [Groupname] v3 auth
Hostname(config)#snmp-server user [Username] [Groupname] v3 auth md5 [Password]
Finally, to avoid repeating all the previous steps each time a simulation is executed and
the switch is started, this configuration is defined as the startup configuration of the switch.
All the previous commands provide the switch with the basic configuration to be con-
nected to the network. These configurations can also be applied to emulated routers using
EtherSwitch cards. Since this is a physical device, it must be connected to GNS3 to com-
municate with the rest of the network. To do so, first the switch must be connected to one
of the Ethernet interfaces of the local computer. Then, in GNS3 is added a cloud symbol
to the workspace which will represent the switch. On the cloud configuration page, the NIO
Ethernet tab is selected and the Ethernet interface name of the local PC where the switch is
connected to is added. The switch is now ready to be connected to the network and this is
a simple procedure to associate a real switch (or any other real network device) to a virtual
network.
With the usage of real switches comes another situation. One of the switch ports was con-
nected to a local host interface to establish the communication with a virtual network running
emulated devices on GNS3. But since this is a physical device with real interfaces, only real
equipment can be connected there. The configuration of all network devices present in the
network simulations for test purposes was already described, so any real device connected to
the switch should be configured as previously explained for the corresponding device type.
To test the developed algorithms, real end hosts were connected to the switch. These hosts
were simple laptops running the Ubuntu operating system. Thus, the network configuration
of these devices is the same as described in the previous section for virtual hosts.
All network equipment, physical and virtual, used on network simulations as well as its
network configurations have been described. In the next section, we will present the network
scenario created to test each of the developed scripts.
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Chapter 7
Experimental Results
After presenting all network equipment and network simulation software used to perform
the necessary experimental tests, it is now time to describe the network scenario that was
created to test the efficiency of the developed methodologies in different situations. This
simulated network will try to embrace a whole set of conditions in order to prepare the
algorithms to be deployed in a real network. Then, all the results obtained from the execution
of the developed scripts over the simulated network will be analyzed. These tests will allow us
to validate the network discovery, IP spoofing and MAC spoofing attacks detection algorithms
and evaluate the performance of these methodologies.
7.1 Testing Scenario
In order to perform the simulation tests, the scenario presented on Fig. 7.1 was created.
The backbone of this network is composed by four Cisco C3640 routers connected to each
other, forming a mesh. This topology intends to test the efficiency of the network discovery
algorithm; as previously said, when performing a network discovery, the algorithm has to
make sure that all managed devices are analyzed once and this network topology intends to
assure that this actually happens whatever the network is. Another Cisco C3640 router (R5 )
is connected to router R4 to test the stopping network feature. This functionality intends to
establish a border between what should and shouldn’t be discovered and, therefore, between
what should be monitored and what should remain private. Thus, by defining the network
that establishes the connection between these two routers (17.1.1.0 ) as the stopping network,
it will be possible to check if the algorithm actually stops and verify if it doesn’t discover R5.
If it works, then we can be sure that it wouldn’t also search for any other network equipment
beyond router R5.
Then, the device identified as PC represents the local machine that it will work as the
monitoring station to manage the network. Router R1 and PC are connected to a router
Cisco C3725 using a switching module (SWR1 ), which in practice is considered an unmanaged
device due to its incomplete MIB but it can be identified by the algorithm. PC1 is a virtual
host running Linux Microcore operating system and it is also connected to the EtherSwitch
router SWR1. PC was configured to belong to VLAN1 and PC1 to VLAN 2. So, the
R5 router interface connected to this LAN was configured with sub-interfaces to provide
communication between the two VLANs.
There is a network connected to router R2 composed by two Cisco C3725 routers using
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Figure 7.1: Simulated Network
an EtherSwitch card (SWR2 and SWR3 ) and three virtual end hosts (PC4, PC5 and PC6 )
running Linux Microcore operating systems. PC4 and PC5 belong to VLAN1 and they are
connected to access ports of SWR2 and SWR3, respectively. Then, PC6 is connected to
SWR3 and belongs to VLAN2. The ports that connect SWR2 and SWR3 are defined as
trunk ports, as well as the port that connect SWR2 to R2. The R2 interface connected to
this LAN was configured with sub-interfaces in order to provide communication between the
different VLANs.
Finally, the vitual router R3 is connected to a real Cisco Catalyst C3750 switch (SW1 ),
which is also connected to two real end hosts (PC2 and PC3 ) running Ubuntu operating sys-
tems. These two hosts belong to the same VLAN. As it was said, the developed methodologies
for the detection of spoofing attacks are only prepared for detection of attacks performed by
hosts connected to the network through switches. In the network scenario from Fig.7.1, the
unique real switch is SW1. Thus, beyond the discovery of this switch, this LAN intends to test
and evaluate the efficiency of both MAC spoofing and IP spoofing detection methodologies.
The two hosts will be used to simulate MAC spoofing and IP spoofing attacks by simulating
a user with an authorized access to the network and an intruder that it will impersonate this
user to get access to the network.
Before proceeding to the next section, in which the experimental tests will be performed
and the obtained results will be analyzed, Table 7.1 shows some information related to each
end host present in the network. This information includes the device hostname, MAC address
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and IP address and it intends to facilitate the task of analyzing the information displayed
after running the network discovery algorithm in the next section.
Table 7.1: End Hosts Information
Hostname MAC Address IP Address
PC 56 AD 66 B4 B2 47 10.1.1.2
PC1 08 00 27 07 49 3D 10.2.2.2
PC2 00 13 D4 2E 5D 93 18.1.1.10
PC3 00 11 2F BB BB 44 18.1.1.20
PC4 08 00 27 23 1C 3E 19.1.1.10
PC5 08 00 27 6F 91 9D 19.1.1.20
PC6 08 00 27 8E 07 31 19.2.2.10
The whole network scenario was explained, as well as the reasons for such configuration
and topology. Besides, information about each end host have also been presented, and finally
the developed algorithms are ready to be executed by the local computer. In the following
section, we will analyze the obtained results.
7.2 Analysis of Results
Starting from the network discovery algorithm, when this script is executed some infor-
mation is required. Figures 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 show three examples of requested information
according to what the user introduces. First, it is necessary to provide the IP address of
any router in the network. It is irrelevant which router is selected because the algorithm is
developed in order to discover all network devices, no matter what the first router is. For test
purposes it was introduced the IP address from one of router R1 interfaces (10.1.1.1 ). Then,
it is asked if the user wants to discover the whole network or not. In case of a negative answer
(Fig. 7.3), the user should insert the first network that won’t be analyzed by the algorithm
and, consequently, none of the following networks will be analyzed. Otherwise (Fig. 7.2),
there will be no limitations and every device on any network will be analyzed. Then, MySQL
database systems require account information from the user to establish the connection to
the server. Once the connection is established, it is possible to create and manage databases.
So, the next step is to introduce the username and password from a MySQL account that the
user has already created.
Finally, SNMP information is needed. SNMP provides the remote interaction between the
local machine and the network equipment. The local computer will work as the manager or
client, while each network device works as an agent, which means that they must be configured
as a SNMP server. The algorithm was developed in order to work with both versions 2 and 3
of SNMP. This gives the user the freedom to choose the version that fits better on his interests.
So, the user should insert the SNMP version that was configured on the network equipment
to provide compatibility with the SNMP commands executed from the local computer. If the
user chooses the version 2 of SNMP (Fig. 7.2), then the community string configured on the
devices should be introduced. Otherwise, in case of version 3 (Fig. 7.4), the username and
authentication password are required.
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Figure 7.2: Information Requested - SNMP v2 w/o Stopping Network
Figure 7.3: Information Requested - SNMP v2 w/ Stopping Network
68
Figure 7.4: Information Requested - SNMP v3 w/o Stopping Network
After all previous information has been requested and introduced by the user, the al-
gorithm have all the necessary information to perform network discovery. For the network
scenario from Fig. 7.1 the algorithm took 3 minutes and 15.741 seconds since it was exe-
cuted until it finished the whole discovery process. This time value was obtained using the
time command, which returns the exact time that a process takes to be executed. When the
algorithm execution finally stops, it is possible to consult the output information that is dis-
played, i.e, the information obtained from all network devices that support SNMP. Starting
from router R1, the output information is presented in Fig. 7.5.
As can be seen, information retrieved from the router MIB was carefully selected and
organized in a readable way. This allowed to obtain the actual Routing table and ARP table
that would be seen if the respective commands were executed on the command-line interface
of the router. In the top of the image, the device type, hostname, manufacturer and model
are described. The last section of this figure presents a table with the IP addresses assigned
to each router interface. By sending only SNMP commands from the local computer, it
was possible to obtain these three tables and the device information, which were the main
objectives for this type of equipment. Now it is necessary to analyze the output information
from the other routers present in the network.
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Figure 7.5: Router R1 Output
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The information obtained from routers R2, R3, R4 and R5 are present in Figures 7.6,
7.7, 7.8 and 7.9, respectively.
Figure 7.6: Router R2 Output
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Figure 7.7: Router R3 Output
72
Figure 7.8: Router R4 Output
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Figure 7.9: Router R5 Output
In all routers, we displayed the device information, Routing table, ARP table and IP
addresses assigned to their interfaces. By analyzing Table 7.1 and the tables with the IP
addresses from each router interface, and crossing this information with Routing tables and
ARP tables, it can be concluded that the presented information is definitely correct.
Referring now to the real switch (SW1 ), the output information is shown in Fig. 7.10. In
the top of the figure, the device information is described: device type, hostname, manufacturer
and device model. Everything seems to be in accordance to the real information of the switch.
Then, its MAC Address Table is displayed. Again, in order to create this table as shown,
a variety of information from the switch MIB was selected and organized in a readable way
in order to be presented to users. The three MAC addresses present in the table correspond
to router R3 and end hosts PC2 and PC3. This information appears to be correct, which
means that the algorithm can correctly analyze any real switch.
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Figure 7.10: Switch SW1 Output
In terms of routers using switching modules, it was explained that this type of devices
cannot be discovered as any other switch. However, the algorithm is able to identify such
devices. Figure 7.11 presents the information displayed by the algorithm when devices SWR1,
SWR2 and SWR3 are detected. As it can be seen, in this case the algorithm doesn’t display
the MAC Address Table of the device, instead, it presents the device information (device
type, hostname, manufacturer and model).
Figure 7.11: Routers SWR1, SWR2 and SWR3 Output
To confirm that the algorithm analyzes only SNMP-enabled devices, Fig. 7.12 shows the
reaction of the algorithm when the end hosts present in the network, which don’t support
SNMP, are detected. Since the algorithm detects the presence of these devices, it is unavoid-
able that it tries to analyze them. So, when the local computer sends an SNMP command to
any end host, a timeout message is returned meaning that there was no reply from the device.
Then, the algorithm simply ignores this host and proceeds to next IP address from the list.
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Figure 7.12: End Hosts Output
During the algorithm description, it was referred that this algorithm would also discover
connections between the different routers. This is actually the last procedure, after all network
devices have been discovered. In Fig. 7.13 it can be verified the routers’ connections displayed
by the algorithm. Comparing it with the simulated network from Fig. 7.1, it can be concluded
that all connections between routers have been discovered.
Figure 7.13: Router Connections Output
Finally, the last objective of this algorithm was to record all this gathered information into
a database system. phpMyAdmin was the management tool used to administrate the MySQL
database that was created. Fig. 7.14 shows that the database tables were actually created
after the algorithm have been executed. As it can be seen, five tables were created: one with
information from all the SNMP-enabled devices found in the network and the other four with
information from Routing Tables, ARP Tables, IP Addresses from all routers’ interfaces and
MAC Address Tables. These tables will allow to record all the information displayed by the
network discovery algorithm.
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Figure 7.14: Database Tables
Let us analyze the content of each table. First, the Devices Table represented in Fig. 7.15
contains information from all network equipment present in the network that was simulated.
Here, it is recorded the device model and manufacturer, device type, hostname and also the
device IP address that was used to remotely access its MIB information.
Figure 7.15: Devices Table
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Then, the Routing Table is presented in Figures 7.16 and 7.17. Without entering in detail,
this table joins all routing information that was displayed for each router, with the detail that
the DeviceID column represents the device from the Devices Table that each line is referring
to.
Figure 7.16: Routing Table content - Page 1
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Figure 7.17: Routing Table content - Page 2
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Information from the ARP Table of each router was also recorded. This can be verified
in Figures 7.18 and 7.19. As in the case of the Routing Tables, these tables also contain all
ARP Table information that was previously displayed for each router.
Figure 7.18: ARP Table content - Page 1
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Figure 7.19: ARP Table content - Page 2
The MAC Address Table was also filled with the respective information, as shown in
Fig. 7.20. This information was obtained from switch SW1, which is the only real switch on
the simulated network that could provide this data. Comparing this table with the displayed
information from Fig. 7.10, it can be concluded that the information was correctly introduced.
Figure 7.20: MAC Address Table content
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Finally, the table containing all IP addresses assigned to each router interface is presented
in Fig. 7.21. It’s easy to verify the veracity of this data by comparing it with the information
that was directly displayed when the algorithm was executed.
Figure 7.21: IP Addresses Table content
All the results obtained from the execution of the network discovery algorithm was pre-
sented. The information was displayed immediately in a readable way for the user and it
was also recorded in a database system for a posterior use. To finish the experimental tests
related with this algorithm, the case where a stopping network was inserted was tested. Thus,
when the information showed in 7.3 was introduced, with network 17.1.1.0 as the stopping
network, it was verified that every network device was discovered with the exception of router
R5. Fig. 7.22 proves this statement by showing the information recorded in the Devices Table
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after the algorithm have been executed. It can be observed that now router R5 is not present
in the table. So, in summary, we can consider that all objectives defined for this algorithm
were achieved and it was correctly implemented.
Figure 7.22: Devices Table without R5
The network discovery algorithm allowed not only to consult information from all network
devices but also to support the MAC spoofing and IP spoofing detection algorithms so they
get knowledge of the presence of these devices to perform the detection task correctly. To test
the developed algorithm for detection of MAC spoofing attacks, the corresponding algorithm
was executed in an infinite loop. The host used to perform the attack was PC2 and PC3 was
defined as the victim. Both computers were configured with different IP addresses according
to Table 7.1. Then, the MAC address of PC2 was changed to match the one in use by PC3.
To change the MAC address of this host, the following commands were executed:
$ sudo ifconfig eth0 down
$ sudo ifconfig eth0 hw ether 00:11:2F:BB:BB:44
$ sudo ifconfig eth0 18.1.1.10 netmask 255.255.255.0 up
$ sudo route add default gw 18.1.1.3 eth0
Basically, these commands shut down the PC2 interface connected to switch SW1 and a
new MAC address is assigned. Then, this interface is turned on and it is configured with the
same IP address and default gateway as previously. This host is now ready to impersonate
PC3 as soon as it starts sending packets to the network.
To simulate a MAC spoofing attack both end hosts will continuously execute ping com-
mands to the local computer. When PC3 starts sending packets, its MAC address is registered
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by the algorithm along with other device information according to Fig. 5.3. Then, when PC2
(the intruder) accesses the network, consecutive changes on the origin of the MAC address are
detected. This was the procedure that was taken to simulate MAC spoofing attacks, while
the developed detection algorithm was running in background. As shown in Fig. 7.23, it
was verified that the attack was actually blocked. The switch interface where the attacker’s
host (PC2 ) was connected was shut down and its connection to the network got lost. On the
other hand, the legitimate host (PC3 ) kept accessing the network without his performance
being affected and never losing connection. To confirm the efficiency of this algorithm, 20
attack simulations were performed, which results can be observed in Table 7.2. It was verified
that the attacks were detected in 18 of the 20 simulations and once the attacks were detected
they were always blocked. The time since the intrusion starts until the intruder’s access is
blocked was quite variable, with a mean value that falls, with 95% confidence, in the interval
[9.368;12.429].
Figure 7.23: MAC spoofing attack detected and blocked
84
Table 7.2: MAC spoofing attacks simulations
Simulation Detected Blocked Blocking Time (s)
1 3 3 12.181
2 3 3 7.271
3 3 3 8.544
4 5 5 -
5 3 3 9.732
6 3 3 18.548
7 3 3 15.572
8 3 3 10.348
9 5 5 -
10 3 3 12.835
11 3 3 7.649
12 3 3 8.640
13 3 3 12.248
14 3 3 13.800
15 3 3 11.561
16 3 3 9.825
17 3 3 12.216
18 3 3 7.459
19 3 3 6.836
20 3 3 10.909
To test the situation in which the location of the device on the network is changed (Fig.
5.5), the same hosts (PC2 and PC3 ) were used with the same previous configuration, i.e,
both computers configured with different IP addresses and using the same MAC address
(00:11:2F:BB:BB:44 ). Thus, instead of changing the actual location of a computer, the two
ends hosts will be used as they were a single one that changed location from the place where
PC2 is to the place of PC3. This intends to turn the simulation process more efficient. So,
having the algorithm running in background, the first host (PC2 ) starts sending packets
to the local machine and, after some time, it stops. The MAC address and its origin were
registered by the algorithm. After a time period greater than 30 seconds, the second host
(PC3 ) executed a ping command. The 30 seconds period has to do with the time defined
as the border between a possible attack and a change of location. Since they have the same
MAC address, this simulates a change on the location of the first host. As it was expected, the
new MAC address information was registered and no attack was detected, as shown in Fig.
7.24. This procedure was tested 10 times and in all of them the algorithm didn’t interpret it
as an attack and the new device location is registered. Thus, it was proved that this method
can distinguish between an attack situation when a computer is impersonating another host
to access the network and when one device changes its physical location on the network.
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Figure 7.24: End host changes its location in network
Finally, to test the defence mechanism against IP spoofing attacks, the developed algo-
rithm was also executed in an infinite loop. The previous two hosts (PC2 and PC3 ) were
used again, with PC3 representing the victim’s host and PC2 the intruder one. To simulate
the attack, the factory assigned MAC addresses of the two hosts were used, as represented in
Table 7.1. In terms of IP addresses, PC3 used the initially configured IP address (18.1.1.20 )
and PC2 changed its IP address to match the IP address of the victim’s host. Thus, PC2
was also configured with the IP address 18.1.1.20.
To perform the simulation tests, we used the same principle as the MAC spoofing simu-
lations. PC3, the legitimate client, continually executes ping commands to the local machine
and PC2 proceeds the same way. When the first computer starts sending packets, its IP
address, MAC address and current time are registered. Then, when the attacker’s host ac-
cesses the network after a period of time shorter than the 30 minutes that were defined, the
algorithm should detect the attack. This was the procedure that was used to simulate IP
spoofing attacks with the IP spoofing detection algorithm running in background. As Fig.
7.25 proves, the IP spoofing attack was actually detected. Thus, the switch interface where
the intruder was connected was blocked. The performance of PC3, the legitimate client, was
affected for a few seconds in which a connection outage was verified. However, after this short
time period the connection was restored and the user could access the network again. To test
the real efficiency of the algorithm, 20 attack simulations were performed. The simulation
results can be analyzed in Table 7.3 and it was observed that 20 out of the 20 attacks were
detected and all of them were also blocked. In terms of blocking time, it was quite regular,
or at least more regular than in the MAC spoofing detection case, with a 95% confidence
interval for the mean time equal to [8.426;9.057].
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Figure 7.25: IP spoofing attack detected and blocked
Table 7.3: IP spoofing attacks simulations
Simulation Detected Blocked Blocking Time (s)
1 3 3 8.079
2 3 3 8.352
3 3 3 8.469
4 3 3 9.042
5 3 3 9.040
6 3 3 10.848
7 3 3 8.612
8 3 3 9.292
9 3 3 9.076
10 3 3 7.536
11 3 3 9.071
12 3 3 7.863
13 3 3 8.795
14 3 3 8.920
15 3 3 8.613
16 3 3 8.424
17 3 3 8.560
18 3 3 9.264
19 3 3 8.452
20 3 3 8.517
To test the case in which a second machine is assigned with the same IP address but not
with a malicious purpose, a similar procedure was performed with the exception that the
first host (PC3 ) starts sending ping commands but stops after a while. PC2 waits a time
period of at least 30 minutes after the first one has stopped and then it also starts executing
ping commands. This will simulate the situation in which a computer is disconnected to
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the network while another one gets connected and it is configured with the IP address of
the first host. We performed 10 simulations following the previous procedures and in all of
them the message presented in Fig. 7.26 was displayed, which means that the new computer
information was registered and the algorithm was able to distinguish this situation from a
real attack. Thus, the new machine (PC2 ) accessed the network without any problems, while
the first one simply got disconnected with no consequences.
Figure 7.26: New end host in network using an IP that was in use
These experimental tests proved the efficiency of both methodologies for the detection
and blocking of MAC spoofing and IP spoofing attacks, even though the first one wasn’t
completely accurate. The algorithms were also able to distinguish between the situation of
a real network attack and when changes on the network were verified. Furthermore, these
methods can be easily deployed by simply running the algorithms and they should work in
any network since all devices are correctly configured.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
After all the network monitoring methodologies have been presented and the correspond-
ing experimental tests have been performed, it is now time to make an overall evaluation
about this work and to take the necessary conclusions. First of all, referring to the network
discovery algorithm, we had to verify if it could discover any Layer 2 and Layer 3 device on
the network that supports SNMP. It was verified, through network simulations, that it actual
happens in practice and any router, switch or router using EtherSwitch card is discovered.
To have a complete set of experimental tests, the algorithm should have been executed with
access points connected to the network too, but unfortunately it wasn’t possible. However,
theoretically, the algorithm should be able to discover this type of devices without any prob-
lem. In terms of information retrieved from each device MIB, after running the algorithm
it was possible to observe routing tables and ARP tables from each router present in the
network, as well as tables with the interfaces names of each router and the corresponding
IP addresses. In the switch case, its MAC address table was observed, as it was supposed.
Consulting these tables was one of the defined objectives for this network discovery algorithm
and it was correctly implemented. The other objective of this moniroting tool was to record
this information in a database for posterior use. As it was seen in the previous chapter, this
goal was also achieved, which means that all the objectives set for this monitoring algorithm
were successfully achieved.
Then, the MAC spoofing detection methodology was intended to detect any attack per-
formed from a host connected to a switch and block the access of this host to the network
by shutting down the switch interface. After running the network simulation, several MAC
spoofing attacks were performed and it was observed that this algorithm was able to detect
and block 90% of them. It is not working perfectly and certainly not ready to be deployed in
a real network, but in any case it is already a good percentage. Other negative aspect was
the time that this method took since the attack started until it was detected. Even though
the algorithm detects most of the MAC spoofing attacks, the time that it takes is very irreg-
ular, which means that sometimes the detection is achieved in a few seconds and in others
it takes some more seconds. This is due to the fact that the detection algorithm is based
on the information contained in the MAC address table of the switch, which is not regularly
updated. But once the attack is detected, the access of the intruder’s host was blocked almost
instantly. On the other hand, a positive point is that the legitimate client is completely in-
different about what happens in background and it is not affected by the attacks. It was also
tested the scenario in which an end host changes its location in the network, whose situation
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could lead the algorithm to interpret it as an attack. In all simulations, the algorithm was
able to distinguish between this scenario and a real attack scenario. So, in general, it can
be considered that the MAC spoofing attack detection algorithm was correctly implemented
with a relatively fast and efficient response to the attacks, but with a performance that can
still be improved.
Finally, for the IP spoofing attack detection methodology the objectives were similar
to the MAC spoofing detection, i.e, detect if an IP address is being spoofed, discover the
source of the attack and block the access of the intruder’s host to the network. Several
IP spoofing attacks against the network were performed and all of them were detected and
blocked by the developed algorithm, which means that the primary objective of this algorithm
was successfully achieved. The only negative point is the fact that the legitimate host loses
connection for a few seconds while the whole process of the intrusion and consequent attack
block takes place. Besides this detail, it was obtained a more regular and shorter blocking time
when compared to the MAC spoofing blocking, which means that this method is more efficient
and accurate. As an overall evaluation of the algorithm performance, it can be considered
that this methodology is able to detect any IP spoofing attack and immediately block it. As
it was said in the algorithm description, in this method the attacker can be accessing the
network from any Layer 2 device. Unfortunately, the algorithm was only tested for attacks
performed from a host connected to a switch and it wasn’t possible to test its efficiency with
APs. It was also tested the scenario in which an end host is disconnected to the network
and another host is legitimately configured with the same IP address. The algorithm was
able to distinguish this situation and didn’t interpret it as an attack. So, as in the case of
the MAC spoofing attack detection, here the objective was also achieved and the developed
methodology was correctly developed and implemented.
Referring to possible enhancements to the developed work, all the developed algorithms
can be somehow improved. In first place, although all implemented scripts are mostly per-
forming their tasks correctly, it’s still possible to improve their efficiency in order to perform
a faster discovery of the network and also to detect spoofing attacks more rapidly. This is es-
pecially important on the second case because the faster the network attacks are detected and
blocked, less information the intruder can obtain and less damage is induced on the network.
It is also important to have an algorithm with the highest possible accuracy. So, the first
improvement would be to rearrange the developed code to obtain faster results and, in the
case of the MAC spoofing detection algorithm, to become even more accurate. An interesting
functionality that could be added to the project is the creation of a graphical interface to
interact with the developed monitoring methodologies. This would allow the user to easily
execute the algorithms, introduce the information that is requested and finally to observe
the results. The graphical interface would be especially important in the case of the network
discovery algorithm because, since the retrieved information is recorded in a database, it
would be interesting to have a graphical interface to consult the results and manipulate the
information more efficiently instead of observing it directly from the database tables. This
would probably be the second feature to add to the project in the future.
The diversity of information contained on each device MIB allows the creation of different
monitoring tools. This project developed a methodology for network discovery and two other
for detection of spoofing attacks. In the future, some other methodologies to perform different
monitoring tasks could be implemented. The great advantage of using SNMP is that, by
executing simple commands from a computer, it is possible to consult and manage a wide
range of information. For example, information related to data traffic on each device interface
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is also available from the MIB. This information could be used to monitor and limit the traffic
on certain network connections. In this case, when a limit is reached, the data packets should
be redirected through other paths. This is just an example of other monitoring features that
could be developed using the SNMP protocol.
In conclusion, the first improvements that could be done should be applied on the devel-
oped algorithms. They are all working well but improvements on their efficiency and quickness
would be necessary. Besides, the graphical interface would be an important feature to provide
an easier interaction to the user. Finally, given the great flexibility of the SNMP protocol,
other network monitoring methodologies could be developed for a better control over the
network.
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